| |
>A memorandum dated June 13, 1995
>to General Maung Maung...
>My dear General,
>Regarding Hector, why can't his visa revocation be implemented - undesirable
citizen, mistreatment of local staff, suspicion of illegal actions, too
many lost passports, etc. My job is difficult enough without his undermining
everything....
>... Please see the attached faxes.... All these should be hand delivered
to the people by hand [sic], particularly to Gen. Abel. Hector and others
paid off or have relationships in most ministries. They get all the news
before the ministers at times.
>I also think in response to these proposals, all good people involved
- Gen. Abel has already offered to help - alternating chairmanships -
and I should be honorary chairman - it helps me here - we have to act
strong as if the USA cannot push us around. But bottom line is we need
the USA for infrastructure - and work must continue on changing their
minds. Now I have to tackle the White House. I have also arranged to see
Bob Dole, hopefully our next president....
>... I did not realize, until now, just how many good friends I have.
Enemies are meaningless.
>Best regards,
>Miriam
>From a memo to
>Michael S. Dobbs-Higginson,
dated June 21, 1995
>Dear Michael,
>... It is my feeling that within two months PCM will be so fed up and
so frustrated at achieving nothing and running enormous overheads that
they very well might decide to close down to stop the hemorrhage of money
and just appoint a representative in Yangon. This would get them nowhere....
>... It is not that I am patting myself on the back, but I am recognized
throughout the world as being the strongest and most influential person
with the government of Myanmar. That is worth a great deal. I will not
get involved in the business side, other than to give my suggestions as
to how and what the Burmese are thinking and making sure that whatever
projects we have get through on behalf of our clients. All banking, operational
and administrative matters will be run by the appropriate people, and
I will do public relations. I currently have slated for appearance 5 television
shows, 3 press interviews and an investment forum on Asia. I will refer
to my colleagues all business matters that I am not certain of.
>Looking at the facts simply, coldly and from a business point-of-view,
what I have described above would be the most sensible route for Peregrine
to take.
>The same applies for Mitsui as I influence the Burmese government and
the Burmese dependency grows stronger daily. I have done an enormous amount
here in the U.S., in Australia and the UK, producing positive political
and economic results for the Burmese. I have managed to diffuse the fallout
from the movie "After Rangoon" [sic] by pointing out that all
this took place before 1988, and it has changed. I have videos and photos
taken by independent non-Burmese news organizations to back up what I
have to say. I have a meeting scheduled with Al Gore, and I believe I
can pull off a big public relations coup by having the Burmese government
represented for very little money by a lobbying firm, the head of which
is doing it for me and believes in what I am doing. He has overruled his
board, and now it is a matter of convincing the Burmese to do it, which
I believe I can.
>Claude discussed with me your concerns over the alternating chairmanship.
This idea came from Gen. Abel, not because he thinks I am brilliant or
that it should be that way, but it is their way of showing Gen. Khin Nyunt
that they are being respectful of me and treating me the way he has instructed
them....
>A June 28, 1995 memo to
>Mr. Dobbs-Higginson...
>Dear Michael,
>... In a conversation with Endo, discuss with him that fact that the
government wants for me to become the official advisor for Mitsui. This
would be very beneficial for us and for them. If that happens, the ministries
will act promptly on Mitsui's requests and I will be able to follow through
openly on everything and no one will dare say no....
>... There is no doubt that the Endo-visit to Myanmar at the same time
as Philip's and my spending the time I did arranging the appointments,
particularly with Gen. Khin Nyunt, for Endo and not for Philip, has caused
me a great deal of damage and certainly put me at risk of losing my job.
They will buy my contract out, but there will be a lot of negotiations....
>... Please note the attached fax from Gen. Khin Nyunt. If you think it
would be useful, please pass it on to Endo-san with the message about
how happy I am that after my recent visit to Washington, the U.S. agreed
to donate drug eradication money. If you have a way of getting into the
internet or Nexus [sic], there is much more publicity on the matter....
>... Change is never easy.
>With best regards,
>Miriam
[top]
size="6" color="#FF0033">In Their Own Words
size="4">Debating U.S. Policy on Burma
The following discussion took place at the September 7, 1995, Congressional
hearing on "Recent Developments in Burma" which was called by
the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific of the House Committee on International
Relations. Those testifying before the Subcommittee and participating
in this discussion included Ms. Holly Burkhalter, Director of the Washington
office of Human Rights Watch; Mr. Ernest Bower, President of the U.S./ASEAN
Business Council; Dr. Josef Silverstein, professor emeritus of Rutgers
University; and Mr. Thomas Vallely, Director of the Indochina-Burma Program
at the Harvard Institute for International Development.
size="4">Questions & Answers
>Chairman Doug Bereuter - Should we ease our opposition to multilateral
development bank assistance to Burma now or maintain the current tough
line that we have had ?
>Mr. Vallely - It [multilateral development bank assistance] may
be the only lever that the U.S. has left. It is a rather large lever,
but it's not so large that it's determinative. If we skillfully put [down]
a road map, unspoken or not, I think the leverage of the international
financial communities is important. The question is what would you use
it for? Part of the lending can be used to solve one of the very important
problems in US foreign policy in Burma and that is, narcotics. This idea
of policing and going around and patching up the relationship to get some
narcotics alleviation is basically a fairy tale.... You need to integrate
the country. Rather than have the various ethnic groups deal through the
Golden Triangle, China, and Thailand and others, the country needs to
be integrated. And I think that integration is a controversial political
issue, but a fundamental political issue as well.... I think connecting
[the assistance] to two U.S. problems, 1) narcotics and 2) getting a constitution,
would be a good use of that aid.
>Chairman Bereuter - All right, who else would like to comment?
Dr. Silverstein?
>Professor Silverstein - I would hope that we will not relax our
financial weapon. I think that's the one [place] where the Burmese military
is most vulnerable. Today its currency is worthless. The internal value
of 6 kyat to 1 U.S. Dollar is shown to be its true value by what it is
worth outside at 110 to 1. Tourists going in are befuddled by the various
currencies, as are businessmen. The PepsiCo Company, for example, which
has invested there, cannot take its money out directly. Instead, it must
use its profit to buy mung bean and things to sell abroad. You can't do
business this way.
>The Burmese in my estimation gave up Aung San Suu Kyi... to get us to
relax on the financial questions. They are sinking in debt. There are
5 and 1/2 billion dollars owed abroad. They have something like a billion
dollars in debt service. And they have financial reserves... about a half
billion dollars. You can't rebuild a country this way.
>Second of all, we hear that there are two-point-something-billion dollars
in investment. We don't hear how much actually has been anted up and how
much has been promised. Very little has been anted up. We know that UNOCAL
has anted up a hundred million because it found gas and is now in the
process of building the pipeline that will produce the wealth. My answer
to you Sir, is that this is the one area where SLORC cannot control anything.
It needs money. We are in the position to control it and we should control
it.
>And if I can just add a couple of points to what I've just said, about
the internal question. The minorities have been members of Burma since
long before the West arose. And they enjoyed autonomy under the Burmese
kings. They were given a federal structure when the constitution was written
in 1947, but it was a faulty constitution which led to unhappiness, unrest
and civil war. Today they stand ready to be part of Burma in a federal
structure that will give them local autonomy and control in their own
area, something that is not an outrageous demand. They are ready to live
with a central government that is politically free and democratic. So,
the ground work for a solution is there, if people would listen to it.
>Mr. Bower - Just one additional point if I may. When you say we
can control the money, I think we can... the question is U.S. multilateral
lending. You have to be careful because the isolationists [are] controlling
the money. Bilateral aid from other countries is something that we won't
be able to control. And, I will argue that we should use multilateral
lending and our power there as leverage. I agree with Mr. Vallely on that
point. I think that's good leverage. I think it had an impact in our relations
with Vietnam.
>Ms. Burkhalter - On the question of sanctions, Mr. Wiedemann [Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] said
two things in his testimony that I like very much. One, he said that we
have no intention of lifting the sanctions that are currently in place.
That is the policy we support. I believe he said that increased sanctions
are an option. They can be avoided if they, meaning the Burmese government,
take positive steps beyond Aung San Suu Kyi's release. And though he went
on to say that we are not looking at increased sanctions at this moment,
I think the fact that he held out the possibility that, if there is no
real human rights progress beyond the release, we would look at something
further, ...was a very, very welcomed statement. And I think that combined
with the concept of a road map, it could make a real contribution in exercising
greater leverage on the SLORC.
>You'd be surprised to hear me say it, but one of the most successful
exercises of sanctions on a human rights question was during Ronald Reagan's
time and it was the Reagan sanctions against the regime in Poland. What
made those sanctions effective was that they were comprehensive. There
were a whole list of them; everything from banning airplane flights to
cultural exchanges, to entry into the IMF - the big ticket items that
the Poles really wanted. But what the Reagan Administration did so successfully
was that they made out a road map, to use the [words] of my fellow panelist.
They laid out quite precisely and quite publicly what it was Poland was
going to have to do. And as Poland did do those things, sanctions were
lifted, one at a time, and it was very carefully [tied to trade] so that
the response was compatible with the initiative.
>Now in my view, we should not have a road map for lifting the sanctions
that exist now. In the present climate of deteriorating human rights abuses,
we ought to have a road map for what is going to happen; additional sanctions
that are going to be clamped down in Burma if we don't see positive movement
in the right direction,... if [we] don't see reasonable progress in [a]
reasonable amount of time. [That] would be very good idea indeed.
>Chairman Bereuter - Thank you very much. I'll turn now to my
colleague Mr. Berman for his questions.
>Congressman Berman - I'd like to understand a little more of
what's happening in Burma economically right now? You have vastly different
>pictures - Mr. Bower, [in his testimony] described [a] Burma that is
making efforts to open up the economy, boost commercial activities by
privatizing state owned enterprises, reducing regulations, and easing
foreign exchange restrictions. $2.6 billion dollars in foreign investment
has been approved. The economy has a far brighter future; sharp increases
in trade and investment will occur. Dr. Silverstein says "ain't so."
What's a guy like me supposed to think? By the way, what relevance does
the answer have to the question of what we should do in the international
financial institutions?
>Mr. Vallely - You didn't hear me. I wasn't particularly positive
on the Burma economy. I said that the Burmese economy is one of the most
closed economies in the world. I said the level of foreign investment
in Burma is extremely low. I think Burma is not on a reform course of
fixing its economy. However, I think Burma has some great potential to
have a market economy. It does not now have a market economy.
>Professor Silverstein is wrong. They have not gone from the Burmese Road
to Socialism to the Burmese Road to Capitalism. They're still on the Burmese
Road to Socialism. They use intervention in all markets. Markets are not
opened. Newspapers are not in existence. Markets, wage rates vary from
one town to another as much as 100 percent. There is no information on
the market. There is no market in Burma. There is an urban market. But
most people don't live in Rangoon. Most people live in the countryside.
Though Rangoon, I agree, has a lot more automobiles, the growth in the
country is driven by resources being sold, not by the creation of wealth....
>We have a thing called [the] twilight zone in which 0 is a planned economy
and 10 is Hong Kong. Vietnam is at 8, going back and forth. And Burma
is at 3, going towards the middle, but sometimes stalled. You ask the
question. "What does that mean?" It means this, Burma is very,
very poor. And that the people... have been living off the resources of
Burma since the isolation began in 1962. And because they lived off the
resources for so long... the minerals, the wealth of the earth... You
know they don't have enough fertilizer. You can go and see in the dry
zone that they are using dung to cook with, which means it's not going
into the ground, which means the production is not going to be very strong....
>Burma [is not] looking to be East Asia. We almost have Burma looking
to be Easter island, which is a Polynesian island that went out of business,
basically. So what we have here is, which I think is a very complicated
thing, is if you just fix the politics, you still have a very serious
problem. So what I am advocating is that you have to fix the economy as
well as fix the politics. And I think SLORC is not necessarily a barrier
to that. But I don't think even SLORC, or the NLD, understand the power
that could come about [if they] began to fix the economy. The economy
is in very bad shape. The potential is much greater than say, Cambodia,
which doesn't have the basic structures of a rapidly growing, sophisticated
economy. At the other end of this spectrum of what you need [in order]
to have a rapidly growing economy, Burma has some of those things - very
well educated people.
>Congressman Berman - So from your point of view, this [is not]
a "liberalizing economy," promoting free market, encouraging
foreign investment, developing infrastructure, and that political liberalization
will flow from this economic liberalization. You're saying there is no
economic liberalization.
>Mr. Vallely - It's the opposite of Tianaman Square. Tianaman Square
came about, Mr. Berman, because of economic growth, because of the rise
of the middle class, of people who wanted more communication, more markets,
more participation. The events of Burma are the exact opposite. They come
about because of isolation. They come about because of failure. And that
failure exists today. And so I think that failure should also be a focus
of U.S. policy.
>Mr. Bower - And my point... is that this is the potential of Burma.
I am saying that this is an historic moment where you have an opportunity
and an openness, the wedge is opening in the door because of the failure.
I agree with your remarks. These are numbers that have come from our Embassy's
presence in Burma that tracks commercial flows. I think the black market
is quite active. I know that Burma is the second largest country in Southeast
Asia, with 45 million people, [who] have a history and a lot of potential
to engage in the economy.
>What I am talking about... is the potential of Burma. There are very
small steps towards opening; opening the markets, privatizing. And the
potential is something I think that we need to focus on. And focus on
it in a positive sense so that we can be involved in building the Burmese
economy and bringing them out of the shell that they have been in, isolated.
Sanctions will probably take them back.
>Professor Silverstein F I just want to make two points. One, the exports
that have gone out of Burma legitimately, that we have traced and know,
are essentially unfinished things, unfinished raw logs, raw minerals taken
from the earth that have no addition, in other words no value-added. So...
the Burmese have provided a kind of a growth statistic that is a draining
the country of its natural resources, without the country being able to
convert and improve and develop an industrial sector to go around it.
>Secondly, I would like to call your attention to the Asian Development
Bank Annual Outlook, April, 1995, in which it points out [that] between
1990 and 1993 imports had been almost totally in consumer goods, not in
the kind of industrial materials that you need in order to build an economy.
So, we have mismanagement.
>I accept the criticism that was made when I [said that they] went from
the Burmese Road to Socialism to the Burmese Road to Capitalism. I said
it more or less facetiously because they talk about [the fact] that they
have changed their hats and gone this way. But it is State capitalism.
It is State controlled all the way. And the kinds of consumer goods that
we see, and the adding of hotels in the urban areas and two or three of
the resort areas, or the treasure such as Pagan, and the karaoke bars
and the others, are designed to attract foreigners to come and spend their
money, not to improve the social economic conditions of the people. And
I would argue that [improvements] will not come about under these leaders.
It will only come about with political change in the country.
>Congressman Berman - You don't sound like an advocate of "trickle
down."
>Professor Silverstein - No.
>Congressman Berman - Mr. Vallely talked about some, I guess
the flip side of... of tied trade, tied sanctions or tied release of sanctions.
[We have] different approaches from either end of the panel. But what
is this road map you have? And I'd like to get the reaction of Dr. Silverstein
and Ms. Burkhalter, too.
>Mr. Vallely - I think it is another piece to the economic puzzle
which is that both the army and the democracy movement need each other
to make the country work. I think the idea of total victory is ludicrous.
>Congressman Berman - You indicated that you wanted to talk
about a series of moves related to responses that we should be making.
>Mr. Vallely - What will be in the road map I guess is the question.
I think number one, would be a new constitution and how you get a new
constitution. Number two, I think would be liberalizing the economy. I
think liberalizing the economy is something that SLORC does not want to
do either... I would do this in a joint effort with the Japanese. The
Japanese spend money on these things and we don't. So if we are going
to do it, we need to use somebody's money, and since we are not going
to spend any money, why don't we use theirs?
>Congressman Berman - I just want to interject... my reaction
[is] that other than Japan's general economic interest and what they can
produce from the investment, their major focus on Burma and constructive
engagement is all based on how they are thinking about China right now.
And that [Japan] is very much motivated by a very strong awareness of
China, what it is doing, and concerns about China....
>Mr. Vallely - I think we should have the same concern. I call
it the new domino theory. [With] the old domino theory, you used to be
worried about communism spreading from [the] Soviet Union and China to
the countries of South, Southeast Asia, East Asia. The new domino theory
is Chinese influence. And what is the US response to that?
>If you go to Mandalay, you will see almost a Tibet-like strategy in northern
Burma where the drug money and the very positive capital flow from China,
which has a market economy, which generates personal savings, which is
a very successful economy, Mr. Berman, that investment is coming into
Mandalay city. You almost have a.... I don't want to overstate this thing...
a very competitive Chinese economy in a very outdated Burmese economy
and that's weakening Burma as a nation.
>The Japanese, and I think the United States as well, should be concerned
about balance of power arrangements in Asia. And I think Burma is one
of those places where balance of power arrangements can help if the US
participates more along with Japan, creating a political mechanism and
an economy that begins to work. I think those are huge issues, but I think
they are possible. And I think the political movement that we are seeing
is a positive thing. I would not have characterized it the way that the
Administration characterized it [in Mr. Wiedemann's testimony], I don't
think you can marginalize Aung San Suu Kyi.
>Congressman Berman - But you have told us what we should be
seeking, a new constitution, economic liberalization.... You haven't told
us what we should be changing. Should we be providing OPIC guaranteed
loans? Should we be changing our vote in international financial institutions?
Should we be peddling arms? You probably don't think that....
>Mr. Vallely - I think the constitutional process needs to have
some sort of multinational agreement, with Japan, the U.S., ASEAN. An
agreement that will say, we want the constitution to look like "X."
And the Burmese themselves have to figure out what "X" is, but
we have enough liability to have dialogue among the parties in Burma to
know what in general terms we might want. And then use the multilateral
mechanisms to try to encourage the forces in [the] NLD and other places,
and the forces inside the Burmese army, that want that change.
>I am not a diplomat in Burma and don't know how to structure the road
map perfectly, but I think I can paint the picture of how to try to do
that.
>Congressman Berman - Dr. Silverstein, what is your reaction?
>Professor Silverstein F My position would be, the Burmese know how to
solve their own problems. They need our help, and we give them our help
by bringing pressure on this military to realize that they're going to
have to step back and allow the people to be their own government and
have the decision-making process in their own hands. [The people] cannot
continue to be the hand-maiden of the military, to be abused in the way
that they are.
>There is no indication from what has been going forward in the last seven
years under the military, that the military has a clear idea of what kind
of an economy they're trying to build. Rather, they have used the various
kinds of contracts that they are in to siphon off added wealth through
the signature money mechanism, through the sale of opium outside of the
country. And the people are not benefiting.
>Mr. Vallely is perfectly correct. Outside of Mandalay, the country is
a disaster. If you go into the border areas where I have spent a great
deal of time, you find the people hungry, short of basic items that are
not circulating. There is no internal mechanism to distribute these goods
and these people are suffering. So, there is no growth going on at this
point.
>Ms. Burkhalter - What I understood the gentleman to be saying,
was that the Burmese have reached the point where, through sanctions,
isolation and pressure, they have given a little; we should now bribe
them to give some more, with Japanese money. And if that's the roadmap,
it wouldn't be mine. Mine would look more like this: It is precisely because
Suu Kyi is free to move about, though not to speak internationally - a
tape of her remarks that was played at the Beijing conference had to be
smuggled out, the government wouldn't let it go [out]... - but more that
it's pretty clear that they do feel the need to respond.
>I think that now the message, and the roadmap, if you will, should be
that within a reasonable amount of time, if the International Committee
for the Red Cross is not [working in Burma] in a way that they find satisfactory;
if there is not a substantive dialogue between Aung San Suu Kyi and the
SLORC; if the country has not been opened up to journalists and others
to look about freely; and if there has not been some substantive movement
on the issue of forced labor and the release of political figures, then
my roadmap would look something like this: There would be a ban on additional
U.S. investments; there would be an end to this drug assistance which
should never have been started up in the first place; we would turn off
our support for the UN operations there, we would be even tougher in international
fora; and heighten the isolation and stigmatization of Burma, not lessen
it.
>Mr. Vallely - And you will end the dialogue between the parties.
>Mr. Bower - And condemn the Burmese people to another 30 years
of living in a time machine under a repressive military dictatorship.
>Ms. Burkhalter - It was not constructive engagement that led to
Suu Kyi's release. It was not constructive engagement.
>Professor Silverstein - If I can just make one remark. I think
we have to recognize there are two forces at work here. The military has
the guns. Aung San Suu Kyi has the people. Until you find a way of bringing
this together, [put] the guns back into the warehouses and let the people
run their own country, and help them to achieve that, nothing is going
to change.
>Chairman Bereuter - Thank you. We're certainly not at a point
of consensus, but I appreciate the inter-panel dialogue. Now, I turn to
the Chair of the full committee, Congressman Gilman....
>Mr. Gilman - Is Burma now jamming the BBC or VOA? Do we have
any information with regard to that?
>Professor Silverstein - It has been reported that BBC has been
jammed. I asked the VOA people here today that if our American broadcasts
were being jammed and they didn't know. But the only one that has been
reported in the press has been BBC, and that's from BBC sources themselves.
>Mr. Gilman - We've had a great deal of debate in the Congress
about whether or not we should have normalcy of relations with Burma,
despite our objections to the form of government; that we may be doing
a disservice to ourselves by not having a lot of communication. I'd like
to ask all the panelists what your thoughts are with regard to normalcy
of relations with Burma.
>Ms. Burkhalter - If by normalcy it means the removal of sanctions
and lack of isolation and ending of stigma, of course I will be opposed
to that. But we strongly favor ongoing dialogue, which has to happen at
the same time it's happening with the SLORC authorities, also with Aung
San Suu Kyi as the legitimate head of that government. We strongly favor
dialogue and a lot of it, at every possible opportunity, ... towards a
resolution of the political crisis. But it must be in three parts. You
can't have a dialogue with SLORC that excludes Aung San Suu Kyi and her
people.
>Mr. Bower - I agree with Ms. Burkhalter that dialogue and contact
are the most important things that we must implement. I think Mr. Vallely's
comments on a road map towards achieving a more normal relationship is
something that should be pursued in earnest by our policy makers. And
I can say that I think that the business community should be considered
as part of the equation, as a positive influence on what we can do in
Burma to help take the very small cracks of openings that we see in Burma
and work with the Burmese people to open their country and become a more
open economy, open society and open market.
>Professor Silverstein - I absolutely believe that we need to be
present and we need to talk to Burma and I think dialogue is imperative.
I do think, however, that we ought to speak with one voice. I don't think
our commercial attache should be talking about great investment opportunities
when the policy of the government is not to encourage or to discourage.
Secondly, I don't think we should have a narcotics officer doing things
that are behind the back or apart from what the State department position
is on the question of narcotics. In short, we should have dialogue, we
should be present, and we should have a consistent policy so that everyone
is relating it and [not] subverting it in one way or another.
>Mr. Vallely - I think it's impossible to get one U.S. policy.
It doesn't work that way. Its competing policies that ultimately lead
to the foreign policy of the country. And I think upgrading of our relationship
with Burma in some way and a series of confidence building steps for both
[the] NLD and SLORC [would] be the way that I would upgrade it. I would
very much think that the United States' interest would want Burma to join
ASEAN. I think if we had more academic contact with Burma, that would
help the forces of democracy. One of the things that is missing in Burma
that you very much need: Burma has no reformers. Burma only has the army
and dissidents. You need to find a confidence-building way from the United
States to create the ideas that have been talked about here at the panel,
to create reform. We need to find that extra step, Mr. Chairman, to upgrade
our relationship so that we can have the forces of reform that have been
so repressed in Burma for so long to take hold, become part of American
foreign policy and become part of the balance of power in Asia, which
I do not mean to be confrontational necessarily with China, but [might
then] have the sense of stability that we need for our own national interest.
[top]
>M Y A N M A R
It is Time for a
More Objective Assesment>
By Michael S. Dobbs-Higginson
Michael S. Dobbs-Higginson is the former Chairman of Merrill Lynch,
Asia Pacific Region and the author of Asia Pacific - Its Role in the
New World Disorder, published in 1993 by William Heinemann Ltd., United
Kingdom.
This article appeared as a series in Burma's official newspaper,
The New Light of Myanmar, September 9-13, 1995.
;Time out" - as the Americans say. Enough is enough. Sensationalist
cries that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Peace Prize winner, is another
Nelson Mandela must be tempered with reason. Objectively, a comparison
with the former Philippine President Cory Acquino [sic], brought to
power after Marcos, is more appropriate. Other than being installed
as the result of a democratic election, the laudable, yet inexperienced
and naive Acquino did little to alleviate the chaos and confusion pertaining
at the time of her election. It was only when President Ramos, a former
senior general, was subsequently elected, that the Philippines started
making real national and economic progress.
>Little fundamental credit seems to have been given to the current Myanmar
government (which took over in 1992) for what it has done to date in
gradually bringing about order and economic progress with comparatively
little of the wholesale repressive, brutal and corrupt practices of
other regimes elsewhere in the world, in both the past and now. Its
unconditional release of Suu Kyi in July '95 and others has received
an initial flurry of plaudits. However, the importance of these moves,
thanks to the liberal/human rights brigade, which hangs on every word
Suu Kyi utters, have [sic] been completely overshadowed by Suu Kyi's
statement that "all that has changed is that I have been released,
nothing else". Further, and more dangerously, she has advocated
that no foreign aid be granted until democratic elections have [been]
held - a ludicrously naive position to take. Without aid, how can Myanmar
get itself to the point, in terms of sufficient economic critical mass
with the concomitant benefits to the people, where such elections [could]
be held with a reasonable chance that the people will then have enough
not to want to lose it in another bout of the 1988 chaos? On a related,
more practical issue, in 1993, the National Convention, which is represented
by 700 delegates drawn from a wide range of different groups, including
the Military, was convened by the Myanmar government to draft a new
State Constitution. In this new Constitution, the military wishes to
follow the Indonesian Constitution model (which ensures the Indonesian
military a substantial role in the country's government), and thus ensure
that the Myanmar military can also play a role in the evolution of the
country towards a more democratic system of government by participating
in the national leadership of the future State government. While there
has been little global, public outcry about Indonesia's system, no doubt
Myanmar's current military government will continue to be bashed for
their temerity in thinking that they too should continue to be involved
in their country's government. A more valid criticism, which has been
levelled by some, is that this drafting process is taking too long -
the government estimates that such process will take another two years
or so to finalize it. To be fair, this begs the question of how long
other countries [took] to put their new constitution in place?
>Having been numbed into virtual insensibility by the endless international
media on the problems of, inter alia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia
with their respective crazed ethnic warfare and the UN's, the EU's,
and the US's inability to arrive at a consensus, about what to do to
resolve these problems, surely it is reasonable that we give some objective
media air-time to Myanmar, which is conversely making a constructive
effort to sort out its problems. Yet it is a country that seems to attract
little serious, in depth and balanced media interest - other than endless
articles on Suu Kyi!
>Why has there been little media interest in interviewing senior members
of the current military government - they have a point of view and in
the interest of fairness, they should be given an opportunity to express
such views. It should be noted that, in the current military government,
there is no individual military "dictator" like, for example,
the former Philippine President Marcos or some of the former Korean
military presidents. Rather, it is a collective leadership and thus,
much more balance[d] and reasonable in its approach. Unfortunately,
what little exposure it has been given to date tends to have been very
cursory, [with] every article being over-larded with a strong negative
bias and much more information about the Suu Kyi point of view. Sensationalism
and/or human rights oriented reporting seems to be the order of the
day. Whatever happened to objectivity?
>From the perspective of recent Asia regional history, it is interesting
to note that many of today's economic successes in Asia have largely
been the result of strong authoritarian governments, many of them military
in origin, imposing order and discipline on their respective countries,
so as to create the structural building blocks for economic and social
development. What is, therefore, often forgotten in the process of looking
today at individual countries in Asia is that each country, both has
started at a different point in time and has been evolving at a different
pace.
>For example, just after World War II, the Kuomintang military government
in Taiwan started this process and it has only recently in the last
few years evolved into a democratic society - only possible due to the
economic success of Taiwan leading to the development of a strong, confident
middle class obliging the KMT to relinquish its hold on the reins of
power. After the Korean War effectively ended in 1953, South Korea entered
onto a period of confusion as Syngman Rhee's democratic party was unable
to bring order to the country. He was toppled by a military coup led
by General Park Chung-hee, who used draconian measures to bring discipline
and thus, more importantly, "progress" to the country. The
events in Korea eventually followed, more or less, the same process
as in Taiwan, with a democratic government finally being established
by the current President Kim Young-sam in late 1992. Thailand's and
the Philippine's past is relatively similar. Indonesia is still evolving
towards... this result. China, while following a somewhat different
path, is also evolving, although, in the process, giving no clear clues
as to what the post-Deng Xiaoping China will be like. Particular emphasis
should be given to the fact that, under a somewhat different process,
Singapore and Malaysia have benefited enormously from strong, authoritarian,
yet visionary governments.
>Therefore, in the context of these individual countries' recent histories
and their undeniable success in moving towards their respective system
of increasingly more democratic governments that meet the requirements
of their own cultures and societies, why is the Myanmar government being
so often singled out as a being the most pernicious and repressive regime
in Asia, if not in the world? To put Myanmar's own history in the proper
perspective, it must be realized that when General Ne Win toppled the
previous democratic government of U Nu with a military coup in 1962,
he sealed off the country [from] the outside world and promulgated the
"Burmese Way to Socialism." Thus, unlike the other Asian countries'
evolution towards economic success ( during the '60s, '70s and '80s),
Myanmar then entered into a period of stasis and everything came to
a grinding halt.
>Finally, after Ne Win "retired" in early 1988, with the advent
of lessening military control, the country faced the pent-up frustrations
accumulated during the Ne Win regime, which led to mounting protest
against the one-party rule; the independence aspirations of the 135
different ethnic groups - particularly those in the north, including
some hard-line, extremist, armed insurgent groups - and the so-called
democratic aspirations of numerous, embryonic political groups. Consequently,
the country then rapidly entered in to a period of anarchy and chaos.
All this resulted in the breakdown of internal and international communications,
rioting, looting, wanton destruction of property (60% of Yangon's industrial
base was destroyed), public executions carried out by different groups,
all of which... took place throughout the country over a period of some
6-8 months. And all of which, comparatively speaking, made China's 1989
Tiananmen Square incident pale into insignificance.
>As the country was literally in a state of anarchy, the Tatmadaw (the
armed forces) formed the State Law and Order Restoration Council on
the 18th of September, 1988, to ensure law and order, safe transportation
and communication, adequacy of food, housing and other essential public
needs and the preparation for the holding of multi-party, democratic
elections, all in the interests of both the State and the people. Following
the State Law and Order Restoration Council crackdown to effect these
objectives, an uneasy "truce" came into being. At the same
time opposition parties of all types; from the naive idealists to the
hard line, insurgent extremists, continued to jockey for power and influence
over how to create the new, post-election Myanmar world.
>Thus, by July, 1989, the inexperienced and naive Suu Kyi, albeit with
all the right theoretical motives, found herself dealing with a wide
range of different interests, in a manner which put her and her supporters
(real and otherwise) at considerable risk vis-a-vis the then law as
prescribed by the then government. After all, Suu Kyi et al. represented
the forces of light against the forces of darkness. In this context,
I am reminded of the early 1930s' hunger march on Washington, DC, when
troops, under General MacArthur, fired on the marchers, killing and
wounding many of them. More recently, there was the 1960s' Kent State
University, USA, incident; namely the US government versus the Vietnam
War protesters, when a number of student protesters were wounded or
killed by the USA's National Guard forces - comparatively speaking not
so long ago! Then, there was the Waco, Texas, incident last year. There
were relatively few cries from the world's international media about
the inaccessibility of all these incidents. Then, what about Mexico
and its previous government's excesses - what sanctions were imposed
on it ? The list is endless. To coin a new, hybrid phrase "self-interest
is the mother of political hypocrisy" particularly in the developed,
OECD world! How quickly people forget history, or ignore other comparable
events. When it suits them.
>Even the most subjective of partisans must accept that, even if only
theoretically, there are invariably two sides of perceived reason to
every confrontation (Hitler, Stalin and those of their ilk being excluded).
The new State Law and Order Restoration Council, by now only some nine
months old, was still extremely jumpy and obviously hypersensitive concerning
its responsibility for ensuring both an orderly transition of power
and no new repetition of the previous anarchy. Therefore, it is not
surprising that it decided to place Suu Kyi under house detention in
order to maintain some element of control over what could be another
potentially explosive situation - it no doubt had very clear memories
of the anarchy that prevailed throughout the country only some nine
months ago - an interesting case of "damned if it did and damned
if it didn't."
>Despite this specific action, most observers conveniently forget that
the government still allowed the press towards democratic elections
to continue. As a result, the promised multi-party, democratic elections
were subsequently and successfully held in May, 1990. Out of 235 parties
that sprang up, only 93 parties were able to put up actual candidates,
with only 27 parties actually winning seats. The net, summary result
was that the Suu Kyi party, the "National League for Democracy,"
won around 82% of the available seats, with various other parties each
winning small percentages. It should be noted that the military allowed
its personnel to vote freely and there was also no coercion by it on
the public to vote for its party - as the results most clearly demonstrated!
Conversely, many acknowledge that the other parties, employed considerable
coercion of both a monetary and physical nature.
>At this point, what most people, once again, often forget is that national
societies need to have time to evolve from an authoritarian environment,
where the individual is told what to do, to a democratic environment,
where the individual has the free choice concerning what he/she wishes
to do. However, it must also not be forgotten that, before the democratic
system can work effectively, such individuals need to have sufficient
education and a sense of personal moral responsibility and accountability
for their activities. An objective, in depth look at the world's so-called
developed countries, such as the USA, will rapidly bring one to the
conclusion that even in developed countries, in an educational and moral
sense, their societies are imperfect at best. To give the USA a break,
one could instead look at the long standing, appalling and endemic corruption
in Italy, the recent corruption cases in France, Germany and Belgium,
all being just a few examples of such imperfections.
>In this context, rightly or wrongly, the military government came to
the conclusion that, from one day to next, transferring power to the
National League for Democracy was a recipe for a democratic "Tower
of Babel" disaster. Further, it could be argued that the government,
quite rightly, took the view that [the] country was simply not ready
for full democracy until a solid, well-rooted governmental and economic
infrastructure had been put in place. Accordingly, they refused to transfer
power and they continued to keep Suu Kyi under house detention. The
world, already frustrated by Suu Kyi's detention, was astonished, shocked
and outraged - after all, perception is 9/10's of most peoples' view
of reality - in this regard, amply assisted by the developed world's
press. I hope that, in the fullness of time, they, and their readers,
>will remember the chaos that followed the UN sponsored "successful
democratic elections" in Cambodia! This action caused Myanmar to
be turned overnight into a pariah state by the West plus Japan - an
attitude easy to take as there were no business interests at stake.
>However, when the new leadership took over in 1992, they determined
that, for the country to evolve, Myanmar had to develop an open market
economy and that it could only do so, provided a basic structure of
law and order could be developed and maintained. This policy has already
begun to bear fruit, thanks in no small part to the support of its more
reasonable and pragmatic Asian neighbors, who have themselves already
been through the same process. Thus, the West's, in particular the USA's,
uninformed, superficial and often voter-oriented views, concerning the
necessity for immediate democratic elections and, in the interim, the
inappropriateness of extending aid and other forms of support (again
with the redoubtable USA leading the way), are largely counter-productive.
>Such views will, in fact, delay the reforms that these governments
are so naively pressing Myanmar to now produce like a rabbit out of
a hat - perhaps they are waiting for, in some rather nostalgic way,
the arrival of a modern King Arthur or, possibly, a reincarnation of
Houdini! It must also be appreciated that, unlike many other countries
in Asia, Myanmar has, as stated above, 135 different ethnic groups,
from which some 16 armed insurgent groups have evolved, some dating
back to the beginning of Myanmar's independence in 1948. This fact,
in turn, has dramatically increased the difficulty of the government
to encourage a sense of national unity and purpose during the period
since independence. For example, Myanmar's situation could be compared
with that, say, of the Philippines, which fortunately has only had to
deal with one primary insurgent (Muslim) group in the south of the country.
It is interesting to note that, despite the magnitude of its task, the
Myanmar government, under the new leadership which took over in April,
1992, has succeeded in coming to peaceful terms with 15 of the 16 insurgent
groups and it has initiated concrete discussions with the ethnic groups
to create self-administered zones or divisions, so as to accommodate
at least some of these groups' requirements for a degree of autonomy.
Further, since July, 1989 to date, the Myanmar government has released
some 38,000 [people], who were detained both during the period of anarchy
and subsequently, for political reasons. It should also be noted that
political detainees were often merely placed under house arrest - as
was the case of Suu Kyi - as opposed to being imprisoned. Finally, after
the 1988 "disturbances," although the Civil Courts and Military
Courts imposed a considerable number of death sentences, none were actually
carried out. No doubt because of the strongly felt Buddhist faith of
just over 80% of the Myanmar population, the Myanmar people including
the government, are a gentler people than some of their regional neighbors,
such as China and Cambodia - a fact which is almost always also overlooked.
Remember Pol Pot and his deranged desire to reduce Cambodia to ground
zero - in the process eliminating some one million people plus, who
got in the way of the grand plan.
>The point, therefore, of this brief historical summary is to emphasize
that firstly, Myanmar only really emerged from isolation in 1992, decades
after countries such as Taiwan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand,
Indonesia, the Philippines and even China (1978) started their respective
arduous roads to economic success and changes in their forms of government;
in virtually all cases towards a more democratic form of government.
It is therefore hardly reasonable to expect Myanmar to be at the same
stage of development as its Asian neighbors. Comparatively speaking,
in law and order terms, it is also well ahead of virtually all the ex-Soviet
bloc Asiatic country counterparts - not too bad for a mid-1992 start
or, if one insists on being a purist, a late 1988 start.
>Further, in human rights terms, its confinement under house arrest
of Suu Kyi in a large house with spacious grounds on the beautiful Inya
Lake, its otherwise respectful treatment of her and its offer to allow
her to leave Myanmar at any time, contrasts rather positively with the
prison cells or "work camps" that major opponents of other
governments have found, or now find, themselves in. In terms of the
comparative number of political detainees, again Myanmar compares well
with some other countries. Put in another way, various informed estimates
claim that as a percentage of their respective total population, the
USA has 0.4-0.5 percent and Myanmar has 0.1-0.2 percent of their respective
population in jail and/or in "work camps" and no different
( possibly even better) than many other countries', past and present,
attempts to bring order and progress to their respective countries.
At this point, it should be clearly acknowledged that the liberal and
human rights activists play an important role in bringing the world's
attention to the excesses and abuses of various countries' governments.
However, such activists, unfortunately, are often too unrealistic, too
demanding and, as a result, too often end up taking irrational, impractical
and, sometimes, destructive positions.
>What is also interesting is that, in late June this year, in terms
of the complexities of these "political equations", the US
government announced that, despite opposition from human rights officials,
it was resuming limited aid to Myanmar, in order to provide assistance
to Myanmar in reducing the production of opium in the Northeast border
area - again, due to self-interest. This, at least, is some belated
recognition that the Myanmar military government is making serious efforts
to deal with these problems and that such problems have substantial
international implications. People also forget that part of the Northeast,
ethnic/insurgent groups' problem is the opium triangle dominated by
Khun Sa, the warlord [sic], aided, it is alleged, by certain Thai and
Chinese friends. Thus, by extension, with more general economic aid
and a concomitant general improvement of [the] economy, with this aid
the Myanmar government will have even more resources to deal with these,
and other, real and serious problems.
>Finally, what is also not appreciated is that, under the previous socialist
system's isolationist policies, the then Burma developed neither capitalist
nor communist friends. Thus, at the end of the Cold War, even the most
repressive regimes, such as North Korea, had some friends who were prepared
to give it some support. Conversely, Myanmar, when it finally emerged
from its time warp cocoon, had no friends, no old alliances and thus
no moral support. Instead, it seems to have become a convenient whipping
boy to be trotted out for some human rights bashing, when nothing much
else is happening or when the human rights and other liberal white hat
extremists, frustrated elsewhere by the business black hats need some
soft target to attack. Who said the world was fair?
>However, despite all these handicaps, since 1992, under the new, more
enlightened and pragmatic military leadership, it has begun the real
process of transforming itself into an open market oriented economy
- with some considerable success. Its Asian neighbors, primarily the
ASEAN countries and in particular, Singapore and Indonesia, have refused
to follow the US government's questionable (vote grand standing?) request
that sanctions be imposed and Myanmar be isolated from the rest of the
world until it mended its ways. And, very recently, the ASEAN member
countries agreed that Myanmar be encouraged to work towards becoming
a member state, as Vietnam became in July of this year.
>Myanmar is now opening up - generally, conditions are improving and
will continue to do so, but only if Myanmar, its government and its
people are given enough room and time to catch up with their successful
Asian cousins, who started a lot earlier! Its GNP grew at some 6 percent
last year and is expected to exceed 6 percent this year (half that of
China's ) while inflation is running at around 30 percent ( slightly
more than China's), all without anything like the foreign-investment
support China receives and separately, the political/size generated
benefits, which China obliges the world to give it. Myanmar is an extraordinary
country with enormous potential - the pre-war jewel in the British colonial
crown. It is way ahead of Cambodia and Laos and, in my view, it will
provide a strong investment alternative to Vietnam. Its military government
is neither naive, nor out to line its own pockets on the scale seen
in some other parts of the world, it is action-oriented and, thanks
to it, the country is now, in a regulatory infrastructure sense, considerably
ahead of Vietnam and China. It is also much less corrupt than these
countries and, for that matter, [than] a number of Western countries
such as Italy! It is also, in some senses, easier to deal with than
India; given the latter's violent swings of its " 'democratic'
Tower of Babel" system, exacerbated by growing Hindu fundamentalism.
>In short, having now made several recent visits to Myanmar to find
out for myself what was happening, I confess freely that I was wrong
in my initial, international-media-led, negative judgment, which I published
in my recent book on [the] Asia Pacific (in late 1993). You could be
wrong too, and hence my desire to give the above, different, and hopefully
more objective, perspective. What should also be appreciated is that,
in Asia, societies place a much greater emphasis on community rights.
They believe that, quite reasonable in my opinion, individual rights
must be subordinated to those of the community - otherwise the society
will break down. If one looks at the West, where the exercise by a variety
of self-interest groups of their individual rights to the point that
such individual rights completely ignore community rights if not actually
conflict with community rights, (for example, the racial problems in
the USA, the Neo-Nazis in Germany, the anti-abortionists who kill pro-abortion
doctors and destroy abortion clinic, etc., etc., etc.), the Asians'
position on this fundamental issue makes a great deal of sense. This
Asian position is not only a product of Asia's millennia-old cultures
but is today a binding, common attitude and objective to the development
of their respective countries' societies. There is therefore, not surprisingly,
a great deal of Asian frustration and anger at the West's , particularly
the USA's, insistence that, as their system is clearly superior, the
Asian nations should slavishly follow suit! Possibly many in the West
forget that many of Asia's cultures were in full flower at the same
time, if not before, more of their Western counterparts' - they also
seem to forget that the Colonial era is over!
>Give Myanmar a break, invest some time and indeed, some money - whether
it is government aid or direct, private sector, investment money - and
you could very likely be backing the last "dark horse" major
winner of this region. You could also assist in the process of integrating
Myanmar into the Asian regional community and making it a part, by extension,
of the global community. In a more specific and immediate sense you
could also be helping, as many other Asian governments and individuals
are, to provide the country with the necessary wherewithal to improve
its human rights record (the determination of which is often a subjective,
unrealistic and generally unbalanced, obsession of many uninformed and/or,
worse still, readership/voter manipulative observers). And, more generally,
to create the necessary condition for the development of a thriving,
articulate, educated middle class, who in turn will provide the necessary
resources for a more rapid evolution towards as a more representational
government system.
[top]
In Brief
Letters to the editor
All letters must include the writer's name and address and are subject
to editing. Letters may be mailed to Burma Debate, P.O. Box 19126, Washington,
D.C. 20036 or faxed to (301) 838-0587.
TOURISM
I should point out at least two errors in your piece by Khin Maung Kyi
["Oasis or Mirage: Should Burma Reconsider its Tourism Policy?,"
Nov/Dec 1995]. On page 11, no mention was made of the beach resort of
Chaungtha, which, in the opinion of this writer, surpasses either Ngapali
or Maungmagan. Also, not all foreign visitors are required to pay US$300:
package tourists, businessmen, children, etc. are exempt.
Whilst I accept that, in order to present a balanced argument regarding
tourism in Burma, it is only fair to provide a spokesman from the SLORC
camp, I object most vehemently to the choice of Paul Strachan as that
spokesman. It is also inadequate to state at the end of his article that
Strachan has "resurrected the old Irrawaddy Flotilla Co....,"
etc: you should have made it quite clear that Strachan is heavily involved
in tourist projects in Burma which are solely benefiting himself and the
military elite. I cannot possibly accept that printing an article by someone
who is making money for himself out of the tourist industry can provide
a balanced counter-argument. This is borne out by Strachan's mad rantings,
viz expressions such as "cruelly hypocritical," "arrogantly
refuse," etc., etc. The man is, as we say in the UK, clearly "barking."
Indeed, the only "cruelly hypocritical" person in all this is
Strachan himself: from opposing the regime and publishing anti-SLORC books
such as "Outrage," Strachan has become the arch-turncoat, and
letters of his which I have, plus telephone conversations, bear this out
fully. Burma Debate should not provide Strachan with a platform to propagate
his specious and obnoxious arguments. To state, as he does in the first
lines of his second paragraph, that the SLORC had no idea of his arrival
in Katha is complete claptrap. They knew - and approved of his every movement
way in advance. And incidentally, "most of Burma" is not now
open to "wandering foreigners." Does Strachan really believe
that "wandering foreigners" can simply "wander" into
Tenasserim Division, Karen State, Mon State, Kayah State, Chin State,
Kachin State and vast tracts of both Shan State and Sagaing Division?
Personally, I believe that Strachan, his inane rantings and his SLORC-supporting
"Irrawaddy Princess" should be scuppered along with "Visit
Myanmar Year 1996" and all other nefarious traitorous schemes.
Yours sincerely,
Nicholas Greenwood
Travel Writer (Burma)
London
Paul Strachan's article, "Burma: To Go or Not To Go?" [Nov/Dec
1995] both simplifies and distorts the issue of tourism in Burma.
He plays on Western post-colonial guilt. "It seems cruelly hypocritical
that well-intentional Westerners should arrogantly refuse the Burmese
people all the comforts... that they take for granted." But it is
not Westerners who deny comforts to the Burmese. It is their own rulers,
the SLORC, who do this. It is not Westerners who have imprisoned dissidents
and reduced Burma to penury.
"Judicial execution in Theravada Buddhist Burma is unknown."
Yes, but extra-judicial execution, together with torture, forced labor
and forced relocation are very well-known and extensively documented.
Most of Burma is not open and free for wandering foreigners, and certainly
not for wandering Burmese. The SLORC is, of course, trying to strike a
delicate balance between the demands of international tourism and those
of a military state. Naturally the 30 passengers of the Irrawaddy Princess
were given good treatment. As a responsible tour operator, one assumes
that Mr. Strachan had made the necessary arrangements in advance. It would
hardly be good for his business were his clients to be hassled or inconvenienced.
"Happy smiling natives" are what tourists like to see, and what
their tour operators are there to make sure they do see.
Mr. Strachan imagines that international agencies and "specialists"
could avert "the disastrous damage" which he admits SLORC has
caused in Rangoon, Mandalay and Pagan. But how can these agencies operate
effectively within a military dictatorship? Even that most impartially
tolerant of agencies, the International [Committee of the] Red Cross,
pulled out of Burma last year.
Rather more useful than refrigerators in saving children from disease
and premature death is the provision of basic nutrition and health care.
There is no suggestion that any of the hoped-for-tourist revenue will
be spent on health or education for ordinary Burmese people. The SLORC
spends 45% of Burma's GNP on armaments, despite the absence of outside
enemies.
Mr. Strachan's Burmese friends are driving Japanese cars, installing air-conditioning
and sending their children away to college. Leaving aside the question
of whether or not this is an important step in the right direction, the
fact is that the vast majority of people in Burma are living, at best,
at subsistence level. Villagers have their crops decimated by war or requisitioned
- as they are themselves - by the military. Rampant inflation in the towns
makes life precarious for most. Of course a few clever or lucky ones will
profit from an influx of foreign capital. This hardly alters the fundamental
situation.
The response we have had at BAG [Burma Action Group] to our Alternative
Guide to Burma has been overwhelming. We are urging tourists to boycott
Burma, encouraging tour operators to hold off from operations there, and
actively discouraging promotion in the media of tourism in Burma. The
use of forced labor and the summary relocation of entire communities are
serious human rights abuses which ought not to be sidelined in the search
for democracy in the country before booking their flights.
If things are so good in Burma these days, how come the refugees on the
Thai/Burma border have steadily increased during the last year? They now
number more than 90,000.
Look again at those faces on pages 12 and 13. They tell a far more ambivalent
story than does Mr. Strachan.
Sincerely,
Yvette Mahon
Co-ordinator, BURMA Action Group
London
[top]
Roundtables
WASHINGTON, DC - A Burma Roundtable was held in Washington on
December 7 with guest speakers Zunetta Liddell, researcher with Human
Rights Watch/Asia who discussed the debate on Burma at the United Nations
General Assembly, and Ms. Hseng Noung Lintner, who reported on the issue
of trafficking of Burmese women and girls from Burma to Thailand.
The Roundtable of February 14 featured Ms. Sarah Burns from the Washington
office of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Ms. Burns
reported on her recent visit to Burma and UNDP operations inside the
country.
Dr. Chris Beyrer, Field Director of the Johns Hopkins University/Chiang
Mai University Program in HIV/AIDS Research, addressed the Burma Roundtable
of February 15. Dr. Beyrer discussed the report, Out of Control:
The HIV/AIDS Epidemic in Burma, which was recently released by the
Southeast Asian Information Network (SAIN).
The Washington Roundtable is co-sponsored by Human Rights Watch/Asia,
The Jesuit Refugee Service, The U.S. Committee for Refugees and Refugees
International. For more information contact Refugees International by
phone: (202) 828-0110 or fax: (202) 828-0819.
NEW YORK - The New York Roundtable is a periodic meeting of organizations
and individuals interested in Burma. For more information contact: Burma/U.N.
Service Office by phone: (212) 338-0048 or fax: (212) 692-9748.
MASSACHUSETTS - On January 8 the Massachusetts Burma Roundtable
discussed the growing political crisis in Burma and planned activities
for 1996.
The February 12 Roundtable featured Katharine Redford of Earthrights
International. An expert in human rights law and indigenous rights,
Ms. Redford has spent more than two and a half years in Thailand, primarily
along the Thai/Burma border. She recently returned from working with
the Karen and Mon, on whose land Unocal and Texaco plan to build a gas
pipeline.
The Massachusetts Burma Roundtable is an informal group of individuals
and organizations working to promote human rights and democracy in Burma.
Meetings are held the second Monday of every month. For information
contact Simon Billenness of Franklin Research & Development Corporation
by phone: (617) 423-6655 or fax: (617) 482-6179.
SAN FRANCISCO - The Bay Area Burma Roundtable is held the third
Wednesday of every month. For more information contact Jane Jerome by
phone: (415) 424-8643.
SEATTLE - The December 14 meeting of the Burma Interest Group
included a briefing and video presentation by Dr. Carrie Steinberg,
who recently returned from three months of volunteer work with Dr. Cynthia
Maung. Dr. Cynthia operates a string of hospitals and health clinics
along the Thai/Burma border.
A Roundtable was held on February 22 to discuss the sanction legislation
introduced in the U.S. Congress. Two video tapes, one depicting training
of Karen soldiers and the other, showing a weekend speech by Aung San
Suu Kyi, were also screened.
The Burma Interest Group is a non-partisan forum attended by representatives
of NGOs, business, academia and other interested parties that meets
monthly to discuss Burma related topics. For more information contact
Larry Dohrs by phone: (206) 784-6873 or fax: (206)784-8150.
LONDON - The Burma Briefing of January 29 featured updates on
current NGO programs. Speakers included Jeroen Jansen of Medecins San
Frontieres/Holland, which has programs around Rangoon and in Arakan
and Kachin States, Florent Dounis, of AICF, a French NGO operating in
Arakan, and Zhu Wei Xing of Health Unlimited with programs in areas
controlled by the Kachin Independence Organization. The meeting also
provided a report on the current European Commission proceedings regarding
the petition to remove GSP benefits from Burma.
The Burma Briefing is a periodic meeting of NGOs working on Burma. For
information contact Edmond McGovern by phone: (441-392) 876-849 or fax:
(441-392) 876-525
HONG KONG - Information on Burma Roundtables can be obtained
by contacting the Asian Human Rights Commission by phone: (852) 2698-6339
or fax: (852) 2698-6367.
BRUSSELS/PARIS - A Burma Roundtable was held in Brussels on February
26 to discuss "Recent Developments in Burma." Guest speakers
included Martin Smith of Article 19, and Michael Braulke, the former
Burma desk officer for the International Monetary Fund.
The NGO communities in France and Belgium host periodic roundtables
in Paris and Brussels. For more information on this European forum contact
Lotte Leicht of Human Rights Watch by phone: (32-2) 732-2009 or fax:
(32-2) 732-0471 or Info Birmanie at Agir-ici by phone: (33-1) 40-35-06-98
or fax: (33-1) 40-35-06-20.
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SLORC
Speaks
Over the past few months, the list of those who have been denied
visas to Burma, or otherwise advised by the authorities that they are
not welcome has grown steadily. The impressive roster includes:
- Australian Foreign
Minister Gareth Evans was refused entry in December when SLORC feared
he would want to meet with Aung San Suu Kyi.
- Assistant U.N.
Secretary General Alvaro deSoto's request to visit Burma in March has
been rejected by SLORC. Burmese authorities suggested instead that he
come in August, far too late for deSoto to report to the U.N. Human
Rights Commission, which is meeting in Geneva in March and April.
- Three members of
the Japanese Diet had the door closed to them in January when SLORC
learned that their itinerary included a meeting with Suu Kyi.
- Congressman Bill
Richardson got the message that he was no longer welcome when he tried
for a visa during a recent Congressional recess. The Congressman was
among a handful of foreigners to meet with Suu Kyi in 1989 while she
was still under house arrest.
- Germany's Development
Minister, Carl Dieter, canceled his trip to Burma after he was told
by SLORC that he could meet with either SLORC officials or Aung San
Suu Kyi, but not with both.
- A Norwegian-led
fact-finding team, made up of representatives from four nations, was
refused visas when it was learned that their itinerary included meetings
with Aung San Suu Kyi, opposition leaders and government authorities.
- Two Congressional
staff members of the U.S. House Committee on International Relations
were denied visas during a recent visit to Asia. One of the staff members
had met with Aung San Suu Kyi during a trip to Burma last year.
- Population expert
Paul Ehrlich and retired admiral James Stockdale, Ross Perot's vice-presidential
running mate in 1992, were among the Stanford alumni whose visit was
curtailed by SLORC.
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Notables
& Quotables
"The woman related to a person with a long nose, whose alien race
killed her great grandfather and father and enslaved the race, with negative
attitude and usual ill will raised a question at a roadside talk in connection
with the unconditional surrender and return to the legal fold of U Khun
Sa's MTA armed troops. She said Khun Sa was given liberty but drug offenders
were in jail and asked whether they could be forgiven like Khun Sa.
I would like to answer that question: U Khun Sa is a Myanmar citizen and
has returned to the legal fold after surrendering unconditionally. The
case will be dealt with according to existing laws and rules."
From the article, "Joining Hands Against Drug Menace", by Maung
Ngwe Soe, which appeared in the English edition of Burma's official newspaper,
The New Light of Myanmar, February 22, 1996.
Book
Review
MyanView, a slender new quarterly published by the Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, presents itself as plugging the
information gap on Burma. This "review of economic and political
trends" portrays Burma as breaking out of self-imposed isolation,
and rapidly moving toward a market economy - a questionable foundation
for a credible publication. In reality, its information is based on distorted
economic statistics purveyed by the military regime in Rangoon and dreamy
reports of SLORC supposedly seeking to settle the nation's political impasse.
Reliable information is hard to find in this newsletter, which purports
to inform busy executives of corporations. As MyanView tells it, Burma's
authorities "have not encountered any obstacles in stage managing"
a constitutional convention. What readers are not told, of course, is
that the military government forbids free expression and imprisons those
who dare to impose "obstacles" to whatever SLORC wants to do.
The newsletter hails "peace accords" between the junta and rebel
ethnic groups - when, in fact, there's merely a military ceasefire (already
broken with one ethnic group) and nothing in writing.
A report in the first issue on "business opportunities" describes
an economy that exists only in Burma's propaganda organs. In this cloud-land,
there's "healthy economic growth" and no mention of the increasing
economic disparity between the privileged few blessed by the military,
and the rest of the population. Indeed, MyanView notes that the Union
of Myanmar Economic Holdings, the military's own slush fund, "has
become not only the preferred economic developing [sic] vehicle for SLORC,
but also the partner for joint ventures with foreign investors."
What can be healthy about a regime that pinches investment in hospitals
and social services, while splurging on defense spending? Yet the latest
issue says that "there are many good reasons to invest in the country."
A better title for this quarterly would be: Burma Through Rose-Colored
Glasses.
Louis
Kraar
New York
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Voices
of Burma
February 18, 1996
LETTER FROM BURMA
By Aung San Suu Kyi
The Burmese are reputed to be one of the most hospitable people in the
world. When I saw a child I took it for granted that formal invitations
to lunch or tea or dinner were issued only to foreigners. Burmese friends
simply dropped in and shared whatever you happened to be eating. And there
was always enough for visitors, however unexpected. Often friends would
suddenly appear in the evening, hot green tea, plum candy, fried beans
and laphet (preserved tea leaves) would be brought out and there would
be an impromptu party. Sometimes the conversation flowed so happily and
the atmosphere was so congenial, the guests would decide to stay for the
night. That would be no problem at all: some smooth thinbyu mats, pillows
and mosquito nets and any room with a fresh breeze blowing through would
be instantly transformed into a pleasant guest dormitory. Night would
descend on a household replete with food and the sense of hospitality
well discharged.
There is no tradition of inns or hotels in Burma. Visitors from out of
town stay with friends or relatives for as long as it is necessary. Considerate
guests come laden with food and other gifts and everybody enjoys the opportunity
to exchange news of births, deaths, marriages, mild scandals and success
stories. Sometimes guests stay on so long the hosts become a little restive.
But there are also guests so cherished their visit is extended day after
day at the behest of the hosts. Having guests to stay is an informal and
elastic process.
Hospitality is no longer so simple. Apart from the high food prices that
make most people hesitate to impose themselves on friends, staying overnight
in a house other than your own involves more than friendship, good conversation
and a cool mat. Visitors must make up their minds before too late an hour
if they intend to stay the night because their presence has to be reported
to the local Law and Order Restoration Council (LORC) before nine o'clock
in the evening. Failure to "report the guest list" could result
in a fine or a prison sentence for both the guest and the host. Nobody
may go away for the night from his own home without informing the local
LORC as well as the LORC of the place where he will be staying. The authorities
have the right to check at any time during the night to see if there are
any unreported guests or if any of the members of the family are missing.
Households which shelter members of the National League for Democracy
or their supporters tend to be subjected to frequent "guest checks"
these days.
These periodic checks can be a mere formality conducted with courtesy
or they can be a form of harassment. There are no lack of cases where
the authorities have marched in the dead of night and flung up mosquito
nets to ascertain that the sleeping population tallied with the names
and members on Form 10. Form 10 is the list of all members of a family.
In some households which comprise more than one nuclear family there may
be more than one Form 10. Domestic employees who sleep at their employers'
homes also have to be registered on Form 10 or they have to be reported
as guests. A person may be registered on only one Form 10 so if it is
necessary for him to be entered as a member of another family for some
reason, his name has to be removed from the original family list.
During the days of the Burmese Socialist Programme Party, Form 10 played
a central role in the daily lives of the people of Burma. It was in accordance
with the household members listed on the form that it was decided how
much a family was entitled to buy of such essentials as rice, oil, salt,
chilies, onions, soap and milk powder from the government cooperatives.
Today the cooperatives no longer supply consumer necessities so Form 10
has ceased to be important in the economic life of the average family.
However, it still features large in the family's social life because it
decides who may or may not spend the night in a house without reporting
to the authorities.
And what can happen if a family fails to let the local LORC know they
have an overnight guest? Both the guest and the host are liable to a minimum
fine of 50 kyats, or to a prison sentence ranging from two weeks to six
months. Since 1988 the cases of prison sentences meted out to unreported
guests have increased hugely. Some of the cases are tragicomic. A young
man caught spending the night as an unreported guest was taken to court
together with his host. The court handed down a prison sentence of six
months to the guest and two weeks to the host. The host, a hospitable
man with a long experience of paying fines for his unexpected and unreported
guests, involuntarily clicked his tongue against his teeth in astonished
disgust. The acting magistrate heard the loud click and promptly changed
the sentence on the host to one month's imprisonment for contempt of court.
The price of hospitality in Burma can be very high.
This article is one of a yearlong series of letters in Japanese and
English featured periodically in the Mainichi Shimbun newspaper.
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Inside Washington
SANCTION LEGISLATION INTRODUCED
Bills to impose sanctions on Burma have been introduced in the U.S.Congress.
On December 29, Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky), on behalf of himself
and co-sponsors, Senators Alfonse D'Amato (R-New York), Patrick Moynihan
(D-New York) and Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont), introduced the "Burma Freedom
and Democracy Act of 1995" (S. 1511), which calls for sanctions on
U.S. investment in Burma. In the House, Congressman Dana Rohrabacher (R-California)
introduced similar sanction legislation (H.R. 2892) on January 25. Both
bills are now with the appropriate Committees. Hearings are expected to
be held in the spring.
WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCES HEROIN STRATEGY
The Clinton Administration announced its Presidential Directive to stop
the increasing heroin flow into the United States. In a statement released
by the White House on December 18, Dr. Lee Brown, Director of the Office
of National Drug Control Policy, stated that international heroin control
is "a major foreign policy objective of the United States." Brown
went on to state that, "We want Burma to take action against opium
production and against the organizations that manufacture and distribute
heroin, but that does not mean we accept the political practices of the
present government. U.S. ability to work directly with the Burmese is constrained
by their repressive behavior. Therefore, much of what can be accomplished
in Southeast Asia will be with Burma's neighbors, non-governmental groups
operating in the area, international financial institutions, and the United
Nations Drug Control Program." It is estimated that over 60% of the
heroin reaching the United States comes from Burma.
Business
Watch
TRADE
FAIR HELD IN RANGOON
The Ministry of Trade sponsored the "Myanmar Trade Fair 96"
from January 6-14. According to the official newspaper, The New Light
of Myanmar, 180 companies from 15 countries, including The Peoples Republic
of China, the Republic of Korea, Japan, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom
and the United States, displayed products ranging from computers and VCRs
to pharmaceuticals. The fair was held at the Myanmar Department Store
on Shwedagon Pagoda Road.
NEW
YORK CITY HOLDS HEARINGS ON SANCTIONS BILL
On February 23, the City Council of New York held hearings to consider
legislation that would bar companies doing business in Burma from receiving
contracts with the city of New York. The bill is being co-sponsored by
four City Council members and is designed to discourage American investment
in Burma by prohibiting companies from obtaining city contracts. Similar
"selective purchasing" legislation has been adopted in Berkeley,
California and Madison, Wisconsin and is now under consideration by the
State of Massachusetts.
EUROPEAN
COMMISSION CONSIDERS BURMA GSP CASE
The European Commission is conducting an investigation of forced labor
practices in Burma in view of a temporary withdrawal of benefits from
the European Union's Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP). A complaint,
jointly filed by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and the
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) contends that
Burma is in violation of Articles 9 and 10 of the Council Regulation (EC)
3281/94 which provides for the temporary withdrawal of tariff preferences
for certain industrial products originating in developing countries whichÉ
practice any form of forced labor as defined in the International Labor
and Geneva Conventions. Relevant information and testimony concerning
this issue must be submitted to the European Commission by March 20, 1996.
COUNCIL
FOR TRADE PROMOTION MEETS IN ROTTERDAM
The Netherlands-Myanmar Council for Trade Promotion (NMCT) is sponsoring
an information meeting on "Doing Business in Myanmar" on March
13. Scheduled speakers include; Pyo Wai Win, son of General Ne Win; H.J.
Stevens, Chairman of the Myanmar Council in the Netherlands; and P. van
Zanten, General Manager of ING Bank. Founded in December, 1995, the NMCT's
goal is to stimulate trade between the Netherlands and Myanmar.
BUSINESS
FORUM TO BE HELD IN RANGOON
"Myanmar: Open for Business," a conference designed to bring
potential investors together with government officials and the business
community, will take place from May 23-25 at the Strand Hotel. Coordinated
by Hong Kong-based INFOCUS (Investment Focus International), the forum's
goal is to provide a comprehensive and balanced perspective on investing.
Participants will have the opportunity to "meet with government at
the ministries, visit operating joint ventures, and network over golf."
Registration Fee is $1,395. For information contact: Heather M. O'Brien,
Conference Manager, Tel: (852) 2581-8062, Fax: (852) 2851-0902, e-mail:
heather@manager.com
[top]
Media Resources
MYANMAR BUSINESS
Trade, invest and make business connections in the emerging economy of Myanmar
U.S. office
Henree Weiner
San Francisco, U.S.A.
Tel: (415) 566-8475
Fax: (415) 773-9519
Myanmar Business, a monthly publication by Options Publishing Services,
Information Specialists and Publishing Consultants, provides a trade and
investment digest, news on infrastructure and other major projects, and
Òhow toÓ tips on making business connections in Myanmar. Editor
in Chief, Ashok K. Nath, is a Burmese expatriate based in Manila, Philippines.
OUT OF CONTROL: THE HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC IN BURMA
The Southeast Asian Information Network (SAIN)
December 1995
SAIN
G.P.O. Box 217
Chiang Mai University
Chiang Mai 50200
Thailand
Tel/Fax: (66-53) 278-549
This report on the status of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Burma and current
control measures summarizes available data, new information, and explores
the reality of combatting the disease in the present political environment.
Recommendations for policy options for dealing with the HIV epidemic in
Burma are made.
ANNALES DE POLITIQUE ETRANGERE DE LA BIRMANIE
1948-1995
Librairie Sudestasie
17 rue Cardinal Lemoine
75005 Paris
France
Tel: (33-1) 43-25-18-04
Fax: (33-1) 46-34-72-75
This second edition, in French, outlining the history of the foreign policy
of Burma, was revised and edited by Richard Sola. The book discusses BurmaÕs
role in the non-aligned movement and the inter-play of other countries,
such as the Peoples Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and Cambodia. Published
by LÕInstitut dÕEtude des Relations Internationales (ILERI)
of Paris, in collaboration with the Far East Intelligence Monitoring society
(FEIM). Price: FF75.
MYANVIEW: A QUARTERLY REVIEW OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TRENDS IN MYANMAR
MyanView
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
Heng Mui Keng Terrace
Pasir Panjang
Singapore 0511
This quarterly publication is designed to provide information to business
executives on vital issues related to economic trends in Burma, particularly
with regard to tax laws, regulations and investment policies. Special supplements
will be published as developments warrant. The annual subscription rate
is US$130. (see review on p. 32)
A REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LACK OF PROGRESS TOWARDS DEMOCRACY IN
BURMA (MYANMAR)
October 1995
The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia
Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade
Ms. Margaret Swieringa
Secretary
Human Rights Sub-Committee
Parliament House
Canberra, A.C.T. 2600
Australia
The report, in two volumes, contains 17 submissions by organizations and
individuals worldwide on the human rights situation in Burma and is in response
to an inquiry made by the Australian Parliament.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE REPORTS RELEASED:
- International
Narcotics Control Strategy Report
March 1996
Southeast Asia and the Pacific
(Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs)
- 1995 Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices
March 1996b
Burma Human Rights Practices, 1995
These reports will be available in print at the end of March but can now
be found on the World Wide Web at: http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/dosfan.html
and at the Gopher sites:
Briefings and Development
STANFORD ALUMNI BARRED FROM ENTRY TO BURMA
A group of 100 Stanford University alumni and professors was denied entry
to Burma despite the fact that all members of the group had valid visas.
The scheduled three-day visit to Rangoon was to be part of a round-the-world
trip to begin January 19 but the Burma portion of the trip had to be canceled
when Burmese authorities rescinded Rangoon landing permits. The refusal
by SLORC was believed to have resulted from an invitation the group extended
to Aung San Suu Kyi to meet with them. Stanford officials unsuccessfully
tried to appeal SLORC's decision by explaining that the group was "not
trying to make a diplomatic or political statement" by extending the
invitation.
BERLIN FILM FESTIVAL FEATURES BURMA EVENT
The International Forum of New Film/International Film Festival Berlin offered
a special presentation of Burmese films during this year's event held February
15-25. The three entries: Mya Ga Naing, a silent, black and white film made
by Maung Tin Maung in 1934 is a slapstick melodrama set in the jungle and
in Rangoon. Nay chi Phyar Hma Ngwee Thaw Gyaunt by San Shwe Maung, also
in black and white, was made in 1977. Set in the snow-capped mountains of
Kachin State, it depicts the rural life of the Kachin people. Mon Shwe Yee,
a classic backstage love story takes place in Pyay [Prome]. The black and
white film was made in 1970 by Win Oo. Prints of Mya Ga Naing and Mon Shwe
Yee will remain available in Berlin. Contact: Freunde der deutschen Kinemathek,
Verleih, Welserstr. 25, 10777 Berlin, Germany. Tel: 49-30-211-1725, Fax:
49-30-218-4281.
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON BURMA HELD IN INDIA
The International Convention for the Restoration of Democracy in Burma was
held in New Delhi, January 4-6. Attended by more than 100 delegates from
Europe, North America and Asia, including several prominent Indian political
figures, the goal of the convention was to launch a global campaign focusing
on Constitutional Issues, Human Rights, Constructive Engagement and the
China/Burma Axis. Following the convention, the "New Delhi Statement"
was released, calling for: tripartite dialogue between the SLORC and the
Burmese democracy movement, Aung San Suu Kyi, and the ethnic leaders; all
governments to not recognize conclusions adopted by the National Convention;
the immediate release of political prisoners; a halt to all international
investment and trade with Burma; a boycott of "Visit Myanmar Year 1996";
and for all countries in the region, particularly India, to recognize that
a democratic Burma is the best means to ensure stability and guard against
the possibility of domination by regional super powers.
KHUN SA "SURRENDERS" TO SLORC
Heroin kingpin, Khun Sa, commander of the 10,000 man-strong guerrilla-force
Mong Tai Army (MTA), surrendered his strongholds in Shan State in January.
According to SLORC, Khun Sa has surrendered unconditionally, although many
inside and outside Burma are speculating that a deal beneficial to both
parties was negotiated. Burma's official newspaper, The New Light of Myanmar,
has gone from referring to Khun Sa as a "half-breed" and "Satan
Masquerading as Prince Charming" in August of last year, to now affixing
the honorific "U" to his name and claiming him as a "Myanmar
citizen" who has "returned to the legal fold." SLORC has
also indicated that they will not extradite him to the United States where
he would face an outstanding arrest warrant for drug trafficking charges.
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