On Miltary Authority (ANA) And Electoral Influence (AWZA)
An Excerpt From: Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics

Preface - This book deals with Burmese ideas about Buddhist mental culture (samatha, meditation and vipassana, contemplation) in the 1988 political crisis. It does so at three levels, including the general level of Burmese political terminology, and at the more specific levels of personal practice by Burma’s leading politicians and their association with and patronage of particular traditions. The attention paid to mental culture on both sides of the political divide is in part due to the importance of meditation and contemplation in Burmese political culture since the colonial period. However, in part, this is also a response to the isolation experienced. On the one hand, members of the NLD [National League for Democracy] have experienced severe repression by the regime and were isolated from society by imprisonment and house arrest. Senior members of the NLD and senior monks have appealed to the regime’s leaders to rehabilitate themselves through the practice of vipassana. On the other hand, the military experienced isolation and fear of mainstream society. To them, these practices represent the last possible instrument for the transformation of the military hierarchy. Contemporary patronage by the military of these traditions is certainly based on its awareness of the powers of these traditions in the creation and dissolution of boundaries and in the legitimization of the state. It is not clear, however, to what extent the practice and patronage of these techniques is the result of its desire to change.

GUSTAAF HOUTMAN - Influence versus authority

Let me propose one approach to understanding the Burmese political arena that I have found useful, namely in terms of the distinction between two different models for political action: the political model that works on “authority” and the political model that works on “influence.” “Authority” (ana) is centralized, whereas “influence” (awza) is distributed. Burmese military leaders operate on the basis of authority, and since they have no interest in transforming their subjects into active citizens, power and agency are not redistributed across a wide range of institutions outside the army. In this system, influence is only tolerated when it flows through channels of authority. Thus, the situation is created where a breakdown in authority becomes a traumatic event that requires the regeneration of influence for which both monks and elections are deemed crucial even by the military. Since an authoritarian system does not rely on anyone outside the structure of authority itself, this means that it is unable and unwilling to dispense rights and privileges outside its own hierarchy - only obligations can be distributed. Democracy is thus reduced to a form of catharsis, a brief moment of relief through a promise that, like Ne Win’s promise, is never realized. In an influence model, however, since it is based on the idea of dispersal rather than centralization of power, individual citizens must continuously be appealed to for support. This then must function on the basis of more than just duties or obligations on the part of its citizens. A system of distributed power simply cannot work without also distributing certain rights and benefits. Once an environment of distributed power exists, authoritarian behavior is turned into the least efficient and most counter-productive way to conduct politics. Forced labor would not work in this system. In my view, such contrast helps explain differences between the regime and the democracy movement. To reduce this difference, as the army would have it, to a simple opposition between indigenous local patriotism, and foreign values that lead to selling the country out to foreigners, is to oversimplify the local debates that are currently ongoing.

ANA (authority)

Ana, in Pali, means “order,” “command,” “power” and “authority.” It is the most commonly used concept to characterize the military regimes since 1962. Let me first cover everyday use of the term. Ana is associated with the naked power of the State irrespective of ethics, as involved in “instruments of government (owners of ana)” who “possess ana” either because they “seize ana,” as “dictators (lord of ana)” do, who set up “dictatorships (views by masters of ana),” or because ana is “delegated” by someone higher, by supernatural sanction or even by elections. Such deferred authority includes the authorized law courts (“owning ana”) and executioners (“sons of ana”). Ana “comes into force” or is “established,” and is “stringently enforced.” To contravene it is to be “disobedient.” It is viewed as a kind of machinery limited to a sphere (“wheel of ana”) and a limited period of time (“ana period”). Ana is closely associated with office and rank, and ana in Burmese history has been significantly sustained by Brahmanic and mundane rituals (magic), including loki-panna. There is, however, an ethical form of ana that is built upon good Buddhist practice and rightful rule. This is linked to the concept of the “wheel of authority” that arises only as the result of correct mental states and intentionality of the king. Furthermore, General Aung San referred to democracy as “the people’s desire, the ana of the people, indicating that the ultimate form of authority is one based on the peoples” appreciation of what is being done for them, namely “influence.”

AWZA (Influence)

Sometimes instructors refer to The Three Awza, including: (1) “food awza, the power that generates the material form of creatures”; (2) “earth awza, the power that makes trees appear”; and (3) “human awza, the power that makes for accomplishment.” The primary meaning is “nutrition.” It is often used to convey the idea of “strength-giving” or “nutritive essence,” as in “rich soil,” but it also “has flavor” and is associated with “nourishment” as opposed to inorganic substance which is “without awza”. Secondarily it means “influence” that “can make someone feel” so that it “permeates a domain.” In this sense it has a fluidity not unlike the English “influence.” When used in conjunction with authority, as in awza-ana, it means an authority that is both regarded positively and is influential. Such would be opposed to, for example, “ana of arms.” Awza, as distinct from ana, “permeates.” On the other hand, it is inalienable, so that awza cannot simply be delegated or inherited, whereas ana can. Yet its effect is felt to be much more positive and goes much deeper than ana. It is important to point out that while ana can be and usually is exercised negatively, awza is never a negative quality or even a neutral term - it is always a positive quality associated with the positive characteristics of a person. Awza is strongly associated with self-purification and elimination of mental defilements through high morality, mental culture, and in particular with loving - kindness and compassion as inherent in byama-so taya and brahma-vihara. It is associated with voluntary co-operation, as opposed to forced co-operation elicited by ana.

BUDDHISM - Awza comes prior to Ana

Ana and awza, just like “authority” and “influence,” blend into one another. One who is greatly influential is often given authority, and one who is in a position of authority is also able to influence. Nevertheless, there is a world of difference between these concepts. To be influential may make one authoritative, but there is a world of difference between being influential and authoritarian. In Burmese history all Burmese kings invariably had ana, but exceptionally few were described as having awza. The exception were those, such as Kanaung Crown Prince under Mindon, who were broadly educated, internationally minded, of good intention, and who were interpreted as having a good all around awza. In short, they were popular or, in modern terms, electorally eligible. The idea of ana is that it is limited by boundaries and frameworks - a domain and some kind of life span such as a period of government; awza, however, is so fluid that it transcends and trickles through all boundaries of time and place. In Buddhism, the techniques of awza are sketched as primary in the ability to maintain order on a voluntary basis, and ana is presented as an extension of this. For example, the idea is emphasized that the future loss of Buddhist teachings should not be an excuse to adopt an ana approach. The Buddha’s field of authority is supposed to be the greatest of any, since through authority of the Wheel of the Dhamma it pervades the one hundred thousand crores of cosmic systems, surviving generations of kings and outshining their limited fields of authority over time. This power is rooted in supreme understanding of the Doctrine of Dependent Origination which the Buddha discovered through his meditation, and which though simple in only containing twelve causes, resulted in his thorough understanding of the 3,700,000 crores of Mahavajira Vipassana Nana. This field of authority can be delegated, for subsequently creatures had the ability to take up his words on his authority in the form of the parittas, so that the suttas, when recited under the right conditions, become efficacious. In General Aung San’s view, this superior authority of the Buddha, based on full understanding of all causes, provides the idiom in which terms the rightful demise of British colonialism can be understood.

MILITARY ANA - and NLD electoral awza

General Aung San stands today for both ana and awza. Aung San was a courageous student who founded the Communist Party, heckled the British authorities, turned on Japan and finally negotiated national independence as a civilian, without relying on his army rank, for he was also founder of the Burmese army. Though Aung San is invariably depicted in uniform, the legacy of Aung San is in fact not so much of ana, someone who founded the army, but a person with awza, who enjoyed the goodwill of the people, and had influence among them. He resisted the accumulation of wealth for himself and lived with an ideal that inspired the Burmese people. Burma’s national independence was attained by Aung San and U Nu as civilians, not soldiers. The army had not achieved national independence. It was the combination of a particular moment and the personal qualities of two leading and popular personalities of Burma’s struggle for national independence that were productive of sufficient awza to rally the population along with them. To stay in power, the army had to draw on Aung San’s awza. When Aung San’s daughter stood up in his name, the army demonstrated that it could only manage ana. However, it was ineffective at managing awza outside its own immediate realm without resorting to instruments of authority. It seemed change was imminent when it permitted elections, but as the years passed, it then proceeded to arrest and imprison more and more elected members of parliament. As long as the army reverts to such instruments of ana, it will eventually prove unable to contain such crises of legitimacy. Stable political systems must permit awza to be the mainstay, and ana to be only an adjunct to this. The above distinction between ana and awza is particularly useful for interpreting the current crisis. It is possible in this way to distinguish between three kinds of politics - awza electoral politics of constructive influence, ana politics of force and illegitimate government, and awza-ana politics of good and benevolent government with the support of the people. The Burmese State is conceptualized as having originated with the introduction of Buddhism, and this gives Buddhist concepts enormous force in Burmese politics. Both awza and ana are based in the Buddhist teachings. Pagoda politics has historically been important in the national independence struggle and continues to be so today, even with the military now rebuilding pagodas in an attempt to augment their awza in an ana manner. The transition from the U Nu electoral to the Ne Win dictatorial phase may be read in terms of the vernacular as a transition from the politics of influence (awza), in which people warm to the leaders because of their personal and other qualities and their ability to converse, influence and persuade the public, to the politics of authority (ana), in which displays of impersonal and omnipresent strength are required to make people obey out of fear of retribution.

Aung San Suu Kyi has awza. This contributes to her authoritative role in Burmese politics. However, this should not be confused with authoritarian behavior. She invokes higher ideas, while the regime’s ana is supported by weapons, military intelligence and loki panna. Post-1962, military regimes have been ana-style dictatorships with good reason to greatly dislike personalities with awza, who are to them like a “loose cannon”. Ne Win never permitted any officer who was liked by the people to climb the ranks, for such a person might eventually usurp his authority. The result was that the worst personalities, those most loyal to Ne Win himself, rose to the top with no benefit to the people. Only the promise of democracy and the periodic gesture of elections, could keep ana in place. Aung San Suu Kyi’s politics is entirely focused on awza, for she has no ana as such (except for the elections which many argue did confer ana on her). This uncontrollable force of awza is the regime’s bugbear. This is why the regime must interpret her influence not in terms of “local” Burmese concept, namely awza, but as a foreign concept, namely “influence.” The generals attribute to her foreign influence, and in doing so they hope to avoid the implication that she has positive influence in this Burmese sense, namely that her personal charisma functions most definitely in terms of traditional ideas of awza. The elections are about the electorate conferring ana upon those who have awza. Realizing this, the current cultural and religious revival that the regime is orchestrating is an attempt to manufacture awza under a future electoral polity in which they hope to secure a dominant position. This is a significant change from the previous Ne Win polity. However, they cannot compete with Aung San Suu Kyi, whose awza is not artificially manufactured and whose politics actually touches the minds of the people and deeply influences their opinions; the military does not have this capability. It can only pretend to express “the peoples” desires.” The regime knows that in an electoral environment it needs to supplement its ana with awza. It has tried its utmost to rule out all forms of influence outside its own center. There is some evidence that this even extends to changing the Burmese vocabulary itself. For example, the latest official government dictionary, published in 1993, interprets awza in an ana sort of way. It does not so much translate it as “influence,” but rather as a synonym for ana. Any subtle distinctions between ana and awza disappear when no distinction is made between “making one’s awza felt,” and “having one's awza permeate.” These are all in fact translated in the dictionary as “asserting one’s authority.” In sum, awza is invariably equated with “authority” and with the exercise of naked “power.” This contrasts with earlier dictionaries such as Judson’s and Hok Sein’s, who preserve the designation “influence” for this term. Such collapse between the spheres of authority and influence would explain why the NLD is seen as a threat.

ANA AND “FOREIGNIZING”

To sustain its preposterous views of self-sufficiency the regime has to “foreignize” those Burmese people not directly linked to the army. The ana approach “foreignizes” genuine Burmese citizens, and “indigenizes” those in authority. In contrast to the large-scale support the regime proudly proclaims it receives from foreign sources in the state-controlled press, every penny the NLD receives is scrutinized by military intelligence and publicized as evidence of support by foreign powers for subversive elements in Burmese society. The regime’s tendency to publicize Aung San Suu Kyi’s every move for propaganda purposes, and its tendency to publicize its own benevolence towards her, meant that Aung San Suu Kyi steadfastly refused to accept any support from the regime. This already began when she refused offers of electricity and food. Indeed, she has sold her furniture and possessions in order to finance her own upkeep. The regime could not handle this independence. In a society permeated by authority with cetana [good intentions] and with the upper hand in the patron-client relationship, not to accept benevolence from the generals is considered a serious snub. The only propaganda they could achieve was to show how she relied on foreign elements. They investigated her every possible connection with foreigners. They confiscated packages sent by her [late] husband and photographed its contents which they published under the heading “The Lady’s privileged foreign connection” in the national press. The packages contained lipstick and a Jane Fonda exercise tape. They also sought to turn her two sons into foreign subjects by canceling their Burmese passports in September 1989, though they had by local traditions become Burmese men since they had carried out the shinbyu novitiation ceremony in Burma. They highlighted every connection Aung San Suu Kyi has with foreign countries in terms of embassy visits and foreign journalists, to show her as propped up by “alien” regimes and their agents (journalists) devoted to “alien cultures.”

CONCLUSION

Ana is an indispensable component in government, but awza is more so. To analyze Burmese politics entirely in terms of ana is extremely one-sided. For a government to be effective, it must be respected and be able to harness full support from the population. In taking an ana army-centered approach: [one] enters into Burmese politics, as does the army, without raising the broader, less tangible, more fluid, local, cultural and Buddhist angles that belong in the awza domain. [One] cannot satisfactorily explain the 1960 AFPFL victories or the 1990 NLD victories except as an expression of authoritarian sentiment by rival local armies. Focusing on the cultural and religious models of Burmese politics would, I suggest, explain a lot of hitherto unexplained features. First, it would explain why the regime could not have anticipated its failure in the 1990 elections. The regime itself has been fooled by the apparently submissive cultural behavior that the Burmese exhibit when they talk to an ana (cf. awza) government. Their sentiments of disagreement do exist, but they remain submerged until the opportunity presents itself to “show their feelings,” whether it be an auspicious time or day, or at the ballot box. These more submerged concepts of politics require a very different approach; not permitted a life outside, the Burmese are primarily coming to terms with their political preferences through “mental politics” in which “mental culture” is as the only one permitted and understood on both sides of the political divide, for it is productive of both awza and ana. Second, Aung San Suu Kyi adopted the higher awza Buddhist vocabulary to express her opposition to the regime pitched in a battle with ana politics. Based on the power of the powerless, it is largely invisible, does not have a single center, crosses boundaries and is therefore much more difficult to describe. This kind of “disorganized” awza politics is - fixed on high profile instruments of authority as it is. Third, as I have explained, the breakdown of ana demands regeneration through awza. This would explain why the regime itself, since the 1988 uprisings, has not only organized elections, but has taken up culture and Buddhism as a platform in order to compensate for its facelessness and its lack of charisma. Ne Win’s awza worked through Aung San, but Aung San has now been “re-assassinated.” As there is no privileged entry point into awza politics, except as what the people of Burma grant the person, the military is now trying to compensate for its facelessness by using culture and Buddhism to gain awza style influence with the electorate in a clumsy “ana” sort of way. Broadly speaking, then, the Burmese themselves, in terms of their outward behavior, and the way they are spun into a web of patron-client relationships, are in no doubt that the generals in power are indeed a form of government, namely an ana government, with ultimate power over their lives. However, they are highly ambivalent and suspicious about this power in a way that does not secure or promise their voluntary co-operation. This is what produces the tragic irony of a government trumpeting its own unique “good intentions” [cetana] while building pagodas by recruiting “voluntary laborers” or “masters of "cetana” [cetana shin].

Gustaaf Houtman is the editor of Anthropology Today and the deputy director of the Royal Anthropological Institute. He has taught anthropology at the School of Oriental and African Studies, Durham University and Goldsmiths College and was a visiting professor at the Institute for the Study of Languages of Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies and a Leach-RAI Postdoctoral Fellow at Manchester University. His book, The Mental Culture Of Burmese Crisis Politics: Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy, was published in 1999 and can be found at
http://homepages.tesco.net/~ghoutman
ghoutman@tesco.net

back to top