LOOKING AT BURMA'S POLITICAL CULTURE

With headlines declaring a political stalemate and international efforts for promoting dialogue stalled, many of those outside Burma are grappling for an understanding of what makes the Burmese political mind tick. On the following pages, Burmese from varied walks of life share their views on the mental culture surrounding Burmese political thinking. What do they see as the cultural and social influences that have an impact on the way people think of politics? How much of a role do religion and traditional values play? And what does it all mean for the future of Burma?

Interview with U Aung Naing
U Aung Naing participated in the struggle for Burma's independence and has taught in the field of cultural and social anthropology with a focus on political science and economics. A former Burmese government official, U Aung Naing has chosen to use a pseudonym for this interview. He currently resides in the United States.

Q: What aspects of Burmese culture have had an impact on Burmese political thinking?

A: There are probably three major influences on Burmese political thought: number one is religion, which as you know, is predominantly Buddhism; number two is feudalism and feudal values; and the third, which has emerged historically, is young people as a force for political change.

Q: How much of an impact do you feel Buddhism has had on Burmese political thinking?

A: Fundamentally, Buddhism teaches contentment and tolerance. There is a large degree of tolerance because people will always regard what is happening as a product of past deeds. For instance, if you are poor or destitute now, it is not necessarily due to someone slighting you or society failing you. It's due more to bad karma from your past life. In Burma people will, to a large degree, simply tolerate their hardships. Politically speaking, it may be difficult to move people to action. But religion is not the sole factor. It is entwined with other factors, perhaps the most important of which is feudalism.

Q: Could you elaborate on that point?

A: I think Burma is still fundamentally a feudal society, where feudal values continue to prevail. While democratic values and processes had been introduced before and after independence in 1948, they were nipped in the bud by General Ne Win with his coup in 1962. But we should remember that even in U Nu's time, he was accused of acting like a King-Emperor by his own minister of information. But then, the feudalism of U Nu was much milder. In feudal society, you have the feudal lord, those officials serving the feudal lord, and the common people, who are the subjects. What was really problematic about Burmese feudalism was that it had no rule for, or guarantee of, succession. You know, throughout Burmese history, it was not always the eldest son who succeeded his father. Once a king or a feudal lord died, all of his sons were equally eligible to succeed him. So if someone seized power, he would often kill off the remaining relatives, except his own brothers and sisters from the same mother. This method of succession and other feudal practices led to two things that have had an impact on political life: one is individualism, and the other is tendency toward factionalism.

Q: In what way does this tendency towards factionalism relate to feudalism?

A: Feudal values have carried over in this sense: essentially, you owe allegiance only to your feudal lord and when you see that the feudal lord's power weakening, the princes begin to start plotting to take over. There is no acknowledging that someone else may be better or more deserving than you. If you look at Burmese history, there were really only five or six kings who were really strong, who were builders of dynasties and who could keep the country together. Once one of these strong kings would die, his kingdom would split into principalities again. I think this mentality has now carried on into modern political life, though in a different form. In Ne Win, you have a very strong leader - one who simply removes whomever he suspects of being disobedient or disloyal, or of becoming popular enough to become a potential rival. Anyone Ne Win saw as a threat would be removed from his position, not necessarily because he had done anything wrong, but simply because Ne Win suspected that he might have done or might do something. This attitude has roots in feudal thinking.

Secondly, the feudal kings exercised life and death authority over you. We have a saying in Burmese culture, kyu-bin-koke-ngok-ma-kyan-z'ya, it's about a type of reed that grows in the swamps. The saying is that if you need to remove reeds, ensure that you do not leave behind any stumps, as the stumps could grow into reeds again. This means that once you get rid of somebody, you must get rid of the whole family and their associates. This thinking is carried on even now; for instance, with the present government you have to submit your personal history when you apply for a job, fellowship or a passport. When doing so, you must list all of your relatives and your spouse's relatives, for three generations back. Essentially, those in power don't look at you as an individual. They want to trace your family background to see if there are any people disloyal to them. If any of your ancestors have been anti-government, you will most likely not get what you applied for. To me, this mentality has been carried over from feudal life. In the old days they would kill you, or kill all of your clan. Now they may not kill you, but they won't let you enjoy your rights. A very vivid and recent political example of this was the removal of Brigadier General Tin Oo, popularly known as the number "1 1/2," and regarded at the time as the second-most powerful person in the country. When he became too powerful, he was removed on some minor charges. Not only was he jailed, but hundreds of officials, both in the military and civilian ranks lost their jobs because of their friendship and association with Brigadier Tin Oo. (Incidentally, "Tin Oo" is a common name in Burma and Brigadier Tin Oo should not be confused with General Tin Oo, a leader of the opposition NLD.) In feudal society, Burmese people generally feared the king, the feudal lord, and still do. For example there is a Burmese prayer that people say every morning or night. When we pray, we always ask, "Because of my good deeds, my prayers, may I be spared the five kinds of enemies." Enemy number one is water - praying that we are protected from floods. Number two is fire - that your house and property be safeguarded from fire. Number three, is the king. Number four is a thief. And number five is those who hate you. You always, say that: "May I be spared from the five enemies." The king is very prominently placed among them. Another aspect of modern day feudal thinking, is the role of astrology and mysticism. The belief in astrology is still very strong. Many events (for example, the issuing of 90 kyat currency notes) could not be explained except through astrological needs.

Q: The third factor you mentioned was youth as a force for change.

A: My feeling is that whenever we have undergone a significant, revolutionary type of change, it has been in the hands of the youth. A predominant change in modern political life started in about 1911 or 1912 with the founding of, the Young Men's Buddhist Association. In the context of religion young people soon moved into political struggles. Three student strikes in 1920, 1936 and 1938 changed the whole political fabric of Burma. An element of idealism and sacrifice was introduced and the political movement was elevated to another level. When Bogyoke Aung San left the country, he was only in his twenties. When he died he was just 32. When he was accepted as a national leader, he was only 26 or 27. The so-called "30 comrades" were all very young, in their twenties or early thirties. When-ever there has been a significant movement that has led to change, it's always been the youth at the forefront. The political elite that ran the country after independence was made up of former student or youth leaders.

Q: Are there certain traits or traditions that help formulate the political thinking of the military?

A: You can't look at the military in isolation. You need to look within the framework that I have mentioned. General Ne Win regarded himself as one of the incarnations of the King-Emperor. To a degree, it may be true: he was literally feared, like a king. And of course, he acted like one. He had no hesitation in removing people, no matter how close they were to him, much the same as the kings before him.

Q: How do you see the future of the Burmese military?

A: First, let me say that I am an admirer who has great affection for the Burmese Army. It was founded by Bogyoke Aung San with many of my contemporaries who were idealistic patriots, serving as his foot soldiers and pledging to give their lives for independence. Recent years have given me great sadness to watch the deterioration that the country is undergoing. As it was said, "Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely." The military has been in absolute power for nearly 40 years and the country is in ruins, with all political and administrative institutions destroyed, and yet nobody is accountable. It saddens me to think of the current state of affairs - the development of warlordism, rampant corruption in the whole society; and the absence of hope, not only for the present, but also for the future, because of the huge brain drain and the closing of institutions of higher learning for years. It pains me even to think about it and I only hope a way can be found to re-establish institutions that are accountable to the people.

Interview with U Tint Zaw
U Tint Zaw was born in Burma's Arakan State. A respected professor at Rangoon University, he spent several years as a political prisoner under the Ne Win Regime. U Tint Zaw is currently a journalist and lives in Asia.

Q: In your view, what things affect Burmese political thinking?

A: Historically, Burmese people believed that when a group was in power, we must listen to them. For example, when I was a young child, in 1946-7, and Aung San and politicians began their strike against the British government, many elders were saying, "No, you should not do that. They are the government. You must listen to them." It is a very conservative way of thinking and this type of thinking remains in Burma today. Also, we are often driven by self-interest. People want to promote themselves, or promote a particular group and they tend to do so at the expense of others. That's why when General Aung San and his group were able to achieve unity among themselves, they became the strongest group in Burma. Aung San was able to unite his group and as a result, he gained respect among the masses.

Q: What does this tendency to operate out of self-interest mean in terms of reconciliation?

A: I think that most of the people who are talking about reconciliation are not really talking about changing a mentality. They merely want to do something organizationally. Perhaps once we have some kind of organizational unity, then a change in our mentality will follow. It may take centuries, however, to achieve that kind of unity. Also, when people claim that they want to have unity, only some are really sincere. Others are saying it because they think that is what they're supposed to say. They think, "If I say this, I may get more support," from both internal and external sources. It's not truly about reconciliation. Just saying that you work for reconciliation doesn't necessarily mean that you do.

Q: What impact do you think military rule has had on the way Burmese think about politics?

A: You have to go back to 1958 when the military took power. For one and a half years, people were saying that the interim government greatly improved the Burmese way of life. They solved many problems that our politicians could not solve, that a democratic government could not. So in that way, some people were saying that the military government was good, better perhaps than a civilian government. After some years, however, people began to admit that yes, they had been good for a time, but a change was needed.

Q: Do you think there is something particularly "Burmese" in the way people approach politics?

A: We cannot say that there is a particular Burmese way of thinking. We have been influenced by Western powers and Western philosophies. We have also been influenced by other Asians, by Indians and Bangladeshis. For example, I come from the Western part of Burma, from Arakan State. Arakan is far from central Burma and is separated by mountains. Geographically, Thailand and India have been more accessible and historically, we have been influenced by these cultures. In Calcutta, academics were very highly educated and very politically minded. Many came to Burma and held discussions and lectures. Many of their books and lectures influenced the Burmese people.

Q: Do you feel that there are different "types" of democracy that may fit better with different cultures?

A: There are many academics who argue that there is a difference between Western and Asian democracy, but in my mind, it is basically the same. Of course, when democracy is applied in Eastern countries, Western countries, Africa, in America and so on, there are some differences according to the historical experiences in each country. But, basically it is the same. When the regime in Burma, the SLORC or the SPDC, wants to minimize the necessity for a democratic system in Burma, it creates differences, saying that Eastern democracy and Western democracy are very different. They say that we are Buddhists and so on, but they are just using that as an excuse.

Q: What is your opinion of the view that the Burmese may not be ready for democracy?

A: Partly, it is true. For example, when we were under the British, we were saying that we wanted freedom and that after independence we would have a democratic system. But the politicians did not have very clear plan to present to the people. When they were fighting the British they wanted freedom, not dictatorship. They believed democracy would naturally follow. So in that sense, perhaps, they were not ready. We can ask now, "Are the people ready?" People desire freedom, and freedom is very much related to democracy, but we are uncertain of what kind of democracy we want. In 1990, I wrote articles about this very fact. I spoke to young student activists who said to me, "We want democracy again." I asked, "What kind of democracy do we want? Do you know?" But they couldn't answer.

Q: If people are trying to gain insight into of what might move the military and the opposition toward reconciliation, is there anything in particular that needs to be understood?

A: If we think of the general population of Burma and the entire military, reconciliation is possible. The majority of the soldiers want to have some assurance of their safety. For example, during the 1988 uprising, I talked with many soldiers and commanders who said, "We are ready. We want to try to have some kind of solution in Rangoon. We soldiers are ready to support that." If we had been able to establish some type of interim government in Burma at that time, the majority of soldiers were ready to support it. And they proved it in the 1990 election by voting for the NLD. They want some kind of peace in Burma. Q: What about ten years later? A: I think that people still want change. They cannot withstand the kind of difficulty they are living under much longer. That's what happened in 1988. The 1988 movement was not organized by any one person. People were fed up with the situation. I was watching the people who came to participate in the demonstration in 1988. They were poor people. And now, it is difficult to understand how severely people are suffering.

Q: Do you believe that the only way change will happen is through another mass uprising?

A: It is not the only way. Within the SPDC there might be some people thinking that there should be change. These people may be ready to start negotiations, but they won't expose themselves. If they do, they will be in danger. So how does one bring together these people and the members of the opposition, is the question. They might not share common goals on everything, but perhaps common goals in a few areas could be identified. We would need to be very careful however, about how to expose this to the public and the timing must be perfect.

Interview with U Maung Maung
U Maung Maung is the current General Secretary of the Free Trade Unions - Burma. Trained as a geologist, he was employed in the Burmese civil service, from 1976 to 1988. U Maung Maung left Burma in 1988 in the wake of the pro-democracy uprising and currently lives abroad.

Q: Do you think there are aspects of Burmese culture that have been applied to politics?

A: Yes, and I have to say that there are aspects of Burmese culture that should not be applied. For example, Burmese are quite laid-back. We often say anadeh ["I feel bad"] and yabadeh ["That's okay"]. These words mean neither "yes" nor "no." This mentality doesn't get you anywhere. We can't continue to be vague and say yabadeh or anadeh because for us, politics is survival and we need to be really precise. We need to say "yes" or "no" or "it's possible." That, I think, is an aspect of the Burmese mentality that needs to be separated from our political thinking. Politics has [changed] very much from what it was 30 years ago. It's not just dreams and ideas built on dreams. Politics need to be looked at in a very practical way. We need to act "lean and mean" to survive.

Q: Has this been a problem in Burmese politics historically?

A: Without being spoken, it's always been there. If you are the head of a government you can afford to be a diplomat about everything. But I think if you are trying to change a system, then you've got to be really specific and efficient in the things you do. And for this, the Burmese mentality of yabadeh and anadeh doesn't work. We have to take that attitude out of the way we do things. Even in the democratic movement, we have to say "yes" or "no." A lot of people may not agree with me. They don't see it as being very polite. They want us to be more polite.

Q: What about the military? Is anadeh, yabadeh incorporated into their way of thinking?

A: Yes, but the difference is that they are brought up in the military way. So when they are told to do something, they have to carry it out regardless of the situation. That is their advantage over the democracy movement.

Q: If those outside Burma are trying to understand the culture of the SPDC or the democracy movement what do they need to look at?

A: It's difficult to talk about the military. With respect to the democracy movement, I would say that it's very hard to define because there is a wide range of people involved. There are the "elders," who have gone through a lot and have a hard time trying to interpret what is taking place in the world today, like globalization or privatization. Because they have had to suffer through the armed struggle and such, it's very hard for them to change. But they are trying to adapt. Then there are the people who were part of the democracy movement in the '60s who had the broad experience of the parliamentary system, the pre-democratic system, and before that the British system. And there are people who came out in '88 and didn't know much about what happened earlier when it came to politics. They are trying to understand the elders, and the elders are trying to understand them. There are also the students from the 1996 movement, who were born under the military system and are trying to relate to these two, three different layers of people who came before them. According to different ages, there are different experiences, making it hard to define the democracy movement as one whole "culture." Even among people my age, who are in their forties and fifties, we might come from different environments where people may or may not have had access to literature, or the international community, or the outside world.

Q: And what do people need to know about the military's view of politics and its role?

A: The military is very proud of itself. Members of the military think that once someone dons a green uniform he is really superior to everybody. I think there are two ways of thinking within the military itself - those who just want to be ordinary soldiers, and those who want to be the masters. The latter are those who think that they should be the masters just because they have the green uniform. We used to look up to the military because they were the ones who gained independence. They were heroes. But when it came to the SLORC period and SPDC period, it all deteriorated. So the mentality of the population has changed.

Q: Do you think there is something relative to Burmese culture that lends itself to the idea of needing leaders or heroes?

A: I would say that we have always looked for heroes. Let's say in '88 - looking back, we noticed that when we were on the streets, we had actually stopped the machinery. But whenever there was a crisis, we called for either Aung San Suu Kyi or Min Ko Naing or U Nu, U Tint Zaw, U Aung Gyi, someone willing to come and solve the problem. For example, I was in the civil service. We should have known what we needed to do. Maybe - and it's a big maybe - if we had done what we now realize we could have done, it might have changed the balance of power at that time. That's why people have been looking to Daw Suu as a national hero. They see her, not the party. People seem to think they need a "hero." That's why they have not been as actively involved as they might be. According to Burmese history, let's say in Mon and Shan history, there is a history of heroes. "King X" went and conquered this land. Or "King Y" had all these riches. But in actuality, it was ordinary people who did all these things. It was the soldiers who conquered the enemy and the workers who created the riches by working mines or tilling the soil. But that was never explained to the people. I think this mentality is something that we have to try to change. It's not easy, but I think it's gradually becoming a reality. That's why I talk about "practical politics." What we're trying to say now is that it's not only Daw Suu. It's not only the National League for Democracy (NLD) or the All Burma Students Democratic Front (ABSDF) or the Free Trade Unions Burma (FTUB). It's a movement.

Q: Is there a difference in the political thinking among the various ethnic groups?

A: I would say at some levels. With those who know politics, and have experience in or have studied politics, I don't think there is much of a difference. But there has been a problem when it comes to the culture around recruitment for the armies. There has been a mentality that armies had to be raised to fight the Burmans, or the Karens, or the Shans. Military recruits can be heard saying, "The Burmans are coming." Whereas it should be, "The military is coming." Right? Building up the military power base often created this divisive way of thinking. This is something that I think is changing. The Karens, the Mons, the Karennis, the Shans, are seeing more Burmans in their ranks, in their territories and seeing that they also suffer the same fate. So the people have come to realize it's the Burmese military that is creating all these problems. It's not the Burmans against the Karens, or the Karens against the Burmans. I think this has gradually been given up for discussion. It is gradual, but good. At the UN General Assembly in 1992, there were delegations from various ethnic groups there representing the movement. Everybody stayed together, worked together, discussed problems together, despite the differences between them. This was a big step forward. And later, a constitution was drafted by the various groups, which became the NCUB [National Coalition of the Union of Burma] constitution. This may be used at some point; it may not be used. But the exercise of having a discussion, having argued it out in a legal way, made everybody work together. So I think when we talk about equality and reconciliation, these things are being practiced. Perhaps in a very small sense, but the concept is there now, on the ground. This did not happen before and this is something that we are quite pleased about. A lot of changes are taking place. That is why the regime has been trying to split up the National Democratic Front (NDF) and the ethnic reconciliation processes. "Come and have cease-fires individually," they say, because they don't want these ethnic organizations to be working with the ABSDF or the NCUB or other groups like that. They want people to believe that it is the military that must come in to save the people from this divisiveness, to solve all these issues, when it is the military that is creating them. It's actually the people who are working on it. The military sees the people working together and, they're trying to stop it from happening.

Q: Some say that, in large part, what drives Burmese political forces is self-interest. Do you agree?

A: It is not that simple. If the Kachin had not looked out for themselves earlier on, who would have spoken for them? And if the Karens didn't, who would have spoken out for them? They had to go out and help their situation somehow. But now that there is the NCUB, they have joined together as a group. Before that, this kind of avenue didn't exist. They had to go out and do it for themselves. It used to be that in the past, the Burmans might go out and not speak up for the Karens or the Karennis. But now, let's say you have a Burman or a Mon [lobbying] at the United Nations, he is also giving statements sent by the Karen or Karenni. When someone is at the International Labour Organization (ILO), it's on everyone's behalf. There is information coming in from the Karen, Karenni, Mon, the Chins, from Arakan. There is more equal representation whenever there's an opportunity.

Interview with U Soe Thinn
U Soe Thinn is head of the Burmese Service of Radio Free Asia (RFA). He was a member of the Burmese Foreign Service from 1969-1988 and was last posted at the Burmese Embassy in Ottawa, Canada. After seeking political asylum in 1988, U Soe Thinn relocated to Washington DC. The views expressed here are his own and do not necessarily reflect the views of RFA.

Q: Do you feel that there's anything unique to the way Burmese think of politics?

A: Most of the Burmese people in the period following independence would think about politics as "party politics," and if you asked a layman to define politics, he would probably describe it as a vying for power. Politicians will do anything to get to a position of power, whether they conduct good governance or not is subject to question. As a matter of fact, one of the reasons the military came into power after 1958 was because the political parties were fighting amongst each other to such a degree that they couldn't involve themselves in governance. The military was not involved in the politics of re-election so they completely devoted themselves to governance. And relatively speaking, their "caretaker government" seemed successful. So of course, Ne Win felt that since they had been successful, why not continue. You also need to realize that a lot of young people only know a one party system - they don't know anything about politics under a multi-party system. So to them, governance is by decree. The people have not really been exposed to what's happening in the world in terms of politics. The 1988 uprising had little to do with democracy. To most people, democracy just meant something different from military rule. The people wanted more opportunity, more freedom. It was more a desire for a better life, than for democracy as a political system. People today are more politically astute than they were 10 or 15 years ago, however. They have more of an idea of democracy now, even though they may not understand the actual rules of a democratic system.

Q: And what about the mentality of the military?

A: The military leaders have a different thinking. It has always been embedded in them that they are the saviors of the country. And they have always used that as a pretext: they love the country more than the rest of the people, because they gave their lives to save the country. One thing that you must understand about the military is that they're very dogmatic in their thinking. They feel that no one can question what they say or tell them anything they don't already know. There are several anecdotes that illustrate this attitude. For instance, one very high ranking military officer was reading a book on economics that he didn't understand. So he said, "Oh the guy who wrote this book doesn't know economics. He's talking rubbish." That's the sort of attitude. If they don't understand it, then it's wrong. A military officer very close to me once said, "You know that General Ne Win says that the military needs good people, not intelligent people." Good people meaning, people who are loyal, not smart people. Military officers have told me that when they took over the government in 1962 and nationalized all of the government operations in 1963, even though none of the military officers were trained to be managers, they were expected to manage technical organizations. Take for example, the banks. Military officers were asked to serve as general managers of banks, even though they knew nothing about banking. So I ask some of these officers, "How do you expect to run this organization efficiently if you don't know anything?" They said, "Well, the most important thing is that we be loyal. We're in a revolution-like mode." Fine. But they have been in that revolutionary mode now for 37 years! Once an officer at a bank told me that he would never listen to his deputy managers or project managers because if he does, it will mean that they know more than he does. If he shows any signs of having less knowledge than those junior to him, it undermines his authority over these people. One has to understand that the military is a war machine - that they've been trained to go to war. In such situations you don't have time for questions from subordinates. Because if you have questions, if you have arguments, then you've lost the battle. That's the way the military operates.

Q: To what degree does the particular personality of Ne Win play into the attitudes of the military?

A: To a great degree. All of these generals know that they are where they are because of Ne Win. He still has a great deal of influence. I've talked to some senior people and they've indicated that because they've worked with Ne Win all of their lives, they know how he thinks. They know what he wants even before he says it. They all call him "Pe Gyi," or father, because they feel obligated to him. Ne Win is a very shrewd politician.

Q: You refer to Ne Win as a shrewd politician. Would you describe any of the other military leaders that way?

A: They have not been given the chance. They're just following what they've been told to do. It's going to come back to them eventually because they've always left it to the big commander, Ne Win, to truly think. And they just follow. When he goes, what will happen? The window of opportunity will be when he dies. What will they do? That is the main question. Khin Nyunt is more of a politician, however, because of being an intelligence person, he knows how to manipulate. Most people in the intelligence community would refute this, but they like to manipulate. Their world is information, just like a politician's. Khin Nyunt has that trait, but he doesn't have the backing. So he has to manipulate, he has to strategize, in order to get the backing. Whereas Maung Aye, as far as I know, has always been a follower. He does what he's told, that's why he's got the backing of the military. Whether he's an astute politician remains to be seen.

Q: What's your reaction when people say that Khin Nyunt is the moderate, and if there is going to be any change, he is the person who's going to initiate it?

A: That...is possible. And if it happens, it will be a marriage of convenience. As I've said earlier, Khin Nyunt doesn't have the backing of anyone, but he's a smart man. If he's a really smart man, he's going to figure out some way to get the backing of the people. The people are still behind Aung San Suu Kyi. If he teams up with Aung San Suu Kyi, he knows that he's going to get the backing of the people. But he's got to pick the right time to do it. A friend of Maung Aye's said to me that he always thought Maung Aye was actually a liberal. Maybe he is, but maybe he's also a smart enough fellow to project an image of a hard-liner. He may be doing this to sustain his position. Both sides within the military know that they have to get the support of the people and the only way they are going to get that is if they align with Aung San Suu Kyi. And whoever does that will have the people saying, "This guy is the real savior." But who's going to put his foot forward first? If you do it too early, you're gone. If you do it too late you're left behind, you become the scapegoat.

Q: What about the technocrats, the civil servants, people in the foreign service.... How do they think of politics?

A: They're all bureaucrats - even the ministers in the cabinet now are bureaucrats. They don't have any room to formulate major policy, they just do what they are told. It's always been like that. They, like the military, follow orders. For example, I was once at a Burmese embassy function abroad when the then Burmese deputy prime minister and minister for finance were talking with the Burmese ambassador. The ambassador was complaining to them that he had very little money to operate the embassy. So the deputy prime minister and minister for finance said, "Let us submit this to the superiors." They were the deputy prime minister and the minister of finance and they couldn't even make such a decision! When you ask whether these bureaucrats think about politics, maybe they do, but it's more personal politics than politics in a broader sense. It's more about "Will I be able to stay foreign minister? Whose side should I be on? Should I stay on the fence?" People don't want to stick their necks out. There's a Burmese saying: "If you don't move, it doesn't get complicated. And if it doesn't get complicated, you don't get fired." So that's the attitude. The real politics of the people of Burma is to sustain. Politics has nothing to do with governance, and has everything to do with power. You're fighting for your survival.

Q: Do you believe that international condemnation has an impact on the regime?

A: Only if it is comprehensive. Rhetoric is not going to help. I've asked very close friends who are in the military, "What would move the regime toward dialogue?" The simple answer: they're not going to talk. They don't have any reason to compromise or come to terms with anybody unless, or until, they're in a corner. And they're not there yet. It would hurt if ASEAN says, "You're suspended unless...." Or the ILO - it's going to hurt them if action is taken. If the United Nations says, "You're put on hold until you do X" that type of action may move the regime. But with ASEAN, for example, no action will take place unless they have a consensus. The UN won't happen unless all the veto powers agree to it. Action has to be very comprehensive. Then, they will talk.