The Burma Project -Burma Debate-

The ILO Technical Cooperation Mission to Burma
May 2000

Just as the International Labour Organization (ILO) was preparing to take steps, unprecedented in its 80-year history, to compel Burma to end the widespread use of forced labor, ILO Director-General Juan Samovia received an unexpected missive from the military regime. This letter hinted at the possibility that, after a decade of stonewalling, the regime might finally be willing to cooperate with the ILO to end a practice it had up until then refused to admit even existed. The generals proposed that an ILO technical assistance mission come to Burma to discuss the situation. Thus began a series of maneuvers and interactions between the ILO and BurmaÕs military regime, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), that reached a climax at the annual conference of the ILO held in June.

At the center of these interactions was an ILO Governing Body resolution recommending that article 33 of the ILO Constitution be invoked against the SPDC for its stubborn refusal to end forced labor. Never before, even during the Cold War years or the struggle to end apartheid in South Africa, had article 33 been invoked against a member State.

By a decisive vote on March 28, 2000, however, the Governing Body recommended a series of actions to be taken by the June Conference against the military regime under article 33 which states:

In the event of any Member failing to carry out within the time specified the recommendations, if any, contained in the report of the Commission of Inquiry, or in the decision of the International Court of Justice, as the case may be, the Governing Body may recommend to the Conference such action as it may deem wise and expedient to secure compliance therewith.

What provoked this strong action was the regime's dismissal of a 1998 report by a Commission of Inquiry comprised of internationally renowned jurists, which condemned the regime for its widespread use of forced labor. Not only had the regime refused the Commission entry into the country, but it steadfastly ignored its recommendations. These recommendations, designed to bring about an end to a practice that the Commission confirmed affected tens of thousands of Burmese people throughout the country, were clear and precise:
a) that the relevant legislative texts, in particular the Village Act and the Towns Act, be brought into line with the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) and this should be completed by no later than May 1, 1999;
b) that in actual practice, no more forced or compulsory labor may be imposed by the authorities, in particular the military; and
c) that the penalties which may be imposed for the exaction of forced or compulsory labor be strictly enforced, in conformity with article 25 of the ILO Convention, which requires thorough investigation, prosecution and adequate punishment of those found guilty.

Only a handful of Commissions of Inquiry have been established by the ILO over the years to investigate the most extreme cases of alleged violations of worker rights and to ratchet up international pressure to compel governments to end such egregious practices. Burma alone refused to listen to a Commission's conclusions. Many observers agree that it was not the regime's concern over the adoption of the Governing Body resolution that led them to pursue an ILO visit, but the insistence of its Asian neighbors, who felt that Burma needed to show the international community that it was willing to make some effort to address the issue. Pressure to take action mounted as June's International Labour Conference approached, for it was there that ILO members would move to implement the Governing Body's resolution.

It was no coincidence that at the same time as the ASEAN Labor Ministers were meeting in Rangoon this May, the Director-General of BurmaÕs Ministry of Labor was carrying on an exchange of letters with the ILO Director-General, defining the terms and conditions under which an ILO mission would go to Burma. Having the regime finally agree to the parameters set forth by the ILO - i.e. that the sole purpose of the mission would be to provide direct assistance to implement immediately the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry and that the members of the mission would be free to make all contacts they considered useful - also seemed to be at the instigation of Burma's neighbors.

And so on May 23rd, less than two weeks before the ILO's annual Conference was to begin in Geneva, Switzerland, an ILO mission set off for Rangoon on a brief four-day visit to meet with government officials, foreign embassy representatives, and others including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of the opposition party the National League for Democracy. The mission included a team of five persons: Mr. Francis Maupain, Special Adviser to the Director-General; Mr. Max Kern, Chief, Freedom of Workers Section; Mr. Carmelo Noriel, a former Philippines Deputy Minister of Labor; Mr. Rueben Winston Dudley, Deputy-Director, ILO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific; and Mr. Richard Horsey, an ILO Adviser based in Geneva. Some criticized the ILO's decision to accept the general's invitation at this time, viewing it only as a last-ditch effort by the regime to stave off any punitive actions that might be voted on by the Conference. But others felt that, even though the regime's motives were suspect, every opportunity should be taken by the ILO to end the practice given the severity of the problem and the large number of Burmese people affected by it.

On their arrival in Rangoon, the ILO mission was the target of attack in the government- controlled press. In its meetings with government officials, the ILO team sought to use the attacks as an opening to hit hard on clarifying the context and objectives of the mission. As described in the subsequent Report of the ILO Technical Cooperation Mission to Myanmar:

"A joint meeting accordingly took place on Wednesday morning. During that meeting (in light of certain articles that had appeared in the press), the mission observed that the ILOÕs image was not necessarily a friendly one in certain quarters but that, even if it could not make the image more friendly, it could at least endeavor to make it more accurate. To that end, it was essential to be as frank and open as possible in order to establish a basis of trust. Contrary to allegations that were often made, the ILOÕs mission was not in any way to encroach on national sovereignty. The ILOÕs philosophy was based on the principle of voluntarism and dialogue. According to the first of these principles, any country was free to become a Member of the ILO and to ratify its Conventions. However, once a country freely agreed to ratify a given Convention it was bound to honor the commitments it had freely accepted. The mission also emphasized that, under the terms of the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the obligation to eliminate forced labor was now regarded as being inherent in ILO membership, whether or not a country had accepted the specific obligations arising from Convention No. 29."

Much of the four days were taken up meeting government ministers and generals. Without exception, the representatives of the regime continued to deny the existence of forced labor. Some argued that if forced labor ever existed in the past, it had surely been eliminated. The mission members responded by reiterating their purpose, pointing out that in light of the findings of the Commission of Inquiry, the government had lost all credibility on this issue. They hammered away with the message that the government needed to establish its credibility by taking concrete action at the highest level.

"The mission also wished to emphasize that, in order to convince the Conference, the results would have to be concrete and precise and involve a commitment by authorities at the highest level. There was a need to overcome the credibility gap which had arisen over the years as a result of promises that had not been kept, and which had to a certain extent been exacerbated by the attitude towards the Commission of Inquiry and its recommendations and by recent attempts to excuse the deficient action to amend the legislation. If, as had often been stated, forced labor did not exist or was gradually disappearing, it should be all the easier to remove the discrepancies in the Towns and Village Acts inherited from the colonial era. In this regard, Order No. 1/99 left considerable gaps in terms of scope and content."

The mission was also able to meet with diplomats and representatives of international agencies. And on its third day in the country, the team met for nearly two hours with Aung San Suu Kyi and members of the democratic opposition. Aung San Suu Kyi had been among those who had initially questioned the wisdom of the ILO's agreeing to send the technical mission at this time. According to the mission's report, during the team's discussions with her:

"The mission emphasized that the Director-General had decided to send the mission only after receiving assurances that it would take place strictly within the framework of the June 2000 resolution of the International Labour Conference, i.e. that its purpose would be to secure the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission of InquiryÉ. On the subject of forced labor specifically, Ms. Suu Kyi stated that the NLD was the only organization from within the country that was concerned with the matter and with following it up. She stressed the continuing gravity of forced labor, particularly in the light of its use by the military, and the extreme form that it could take with the enlistment of child soldiers."

The serious nature of Burma's situation eventually appeared to seep in with the regime, despite its repeated denials of any wrongdoing. On the morning the team was scheduled to depart, they were brought before SPDC Secretary-1, Lieutenant General Khin Nyunt, whom they briefed on the discussions that had taken place during their visit:

" The in-depth talks the mission had had on technical and legal matters had made it possible to pinpoint what needed to be done. If appropriate measures were taken on these specific points and applied effectively, this would send a very strong message to the international community so that it would understand, as Secretary -1 had said, that Myanmar did not want to remain an island. However, it was up to the Government itself to draw, in full freedom, the logical conclusions of its wish to open up to the outside world."

Khin Nyunt's response did not diverge from the message the team had received in its previous meetings with government officials:

"Although he acknowledged that there might have been recourse to so-called forced labor when work was being carried out on the infrastructure, these practices had ceased before the ILO [Commission of Inquiry] report had been completed. The Government was fully aware that it could not remain isolated at this time of globalization. He hoped that the International Labour Conference would be guided by considerations of justice and not by political preoccupations. Human rights should not give rise to discrimination."

A surprise twist came just three hours before the members of the mission were to board their flight back home. A letter for the ILO Director-General from the Minister of Labor, Major General Tin Ngwe, was hand- delivered to the team. Much of its contents merely repeated what the mission had been told during its visit. However, one sentence stood out:

"I would like to take this opportunity to inform you that we have taken and are taking the necessary measures to ensure that there are no instances of forced labor in Myanmar."

By confessing that they not only "have taken" but also "are taking" measures to prohibit forced labor, the military rulers may have for the first time admitted to the existence of forced labor in the county. Some argued that this should be viewed as a breakthrough. The pas de deux came to a close in June with the vote at the ILO Conference, which indicated that the vast majority of delegates decided not to accept the four-day mission, or the letter provided to the team as they departed, as sufficient steps to set aside the Governing Body's recommendation to invoke article 33. As of June 14, 2000, Burma became the first ILO member State to face a series of actions by the ILO and its constituents for failure to implement the recommendations of a Commission of Inquiry. The gestures did buy some time for the regime, however, in that the Conference agreed that the Governing Body would once again review the situation at its next meeting in November before the actions against the regime would commence.

What must the regime do in the next five months to avoid this? According to the ILO, the answer is clear and simple. The regime must end the practice of forced labor. Was all th effort by the ILO, including the eleventh-hour mission to convince the regime to act, worth it? Only time will tell.