In Their Own Words

VOICES ON THE ILO

Mr. Andrew Samet
U.S. Government Delegate to the ILO

BD: What was the United States Government's reaction to the ILO's decision to send the technical cooperation mission in May? Was it supportive?

Mr. Samet: It wasn't a decision for the US Government. It was a decision the ILO Director-General made. He assessed the information he had before him and made a decision to send that mission. That was his best judgement and we have no reason to question his best judgement. I think the important thing is what came out of the mission. Our view of what came out of the mission essentially boiled down to this: they met with four generals of the regime, and they all seemed to say there was no forced labor in Burma. The only thing they couldn't agree on is whether there ever had been any forced labor in Burma. And if you look at it, that's all that the report [of the mission] seems to say.

BD: Why do you think the Burmese agreed to extend the invitation at that point in time?

Mr. Samet: You'd have to ask the Burmese that.

BD: Some say it was pressure by the ASEAN governments. Do you have any indications that was the case?

Mr. Samet: I have no particular knowledge about the ASEAN governments' discussions, but it is a fact that there was an invitation for the mission to come after the ASEAN labor ministers' meeting. Whether that's purely coincidence or there's some direct causation between those two factors, that's to be known by the people who were at that meeting.

BD: What about the draft resolution that some of the ASEAN nations put forward at the Selection Committee meeting was that expected?

Mr. Samet: We weren't surprised that some of the countries drafted an alternative to the resolution, but I don't think that alternative formulation ever had support from a significant number of governments, let alone from workers and employers in the Selection Committee. It was really not extensively discussed as an option to deal with the serious nature of the issue.

BD: So there wasn't what you would consider serious debate during the Selection Committee meetings on the resolution?

Mr. Samet: There was very serious debate on the question of what the resolution would be. I just don't think that there was any significant support for the kind of language that had been put forward in that particular formulation. Our view was, we were prepared to move forward with the emergency resolution as voted on by the Governing Body. Ultimately the Selection Committee chairman put forward a resolution that had some modifications, in terms of timing and in terms of recognition that the mission had gone. The alternative put forward by some of the governments in the region was essentially to do nothing, to delay everything. That didn't command a majority of support in the Selection Committee, and it commanded no support in the Workers' Group. In fact, the vote that occurred [in the Selection Committee] on the Chairman's resolution was overwhelming and the only governments that opposed the Chairman's resolution, I believe, were those who were directly associated with that alternative proposal.

BD: Were you pleased with the final resolution as it came out of the Selection Committee?

Mr. Samet: Well, as I indicated, the United States was prepared to move forward immediately, we were certainly supportive of that, as I think the European Union was. The question isn't whether the US Government is pleased or not; the question is, What's the situation with regard to the Burmese people and what is the International Labour Organization's action with regard to that situation? After all, we have to keep in mind that this resolution, which is extraordinary, comes after more than a decade - and in some ways more than two decades - of expressed concern to the Burmese regime about its complete and utter disregard of the most fundamental obligations of being a member of the International Labour Organization. This process in the ILO reflected many years of asking the regime to respond, pleading with the regime to respond, and then ultimately, in terms of the Commission of Inquiry process and the emergency resolution last year, demanding that the regime respond. So while some may argue that we're being too hasty here, I wonder whether history will judge that the ILO was too slow to respond. That, I think, remains to be seen.

BD: Some felt that during the discussion in the Selection Committee the Employers' Group may have been waning in its support to go ahead with implementing article 33. Do you believe that to be true?

Mr. Samet: I don't think the vote this year actually showed much difference from last year's vote on the emergency resolution. The governments that either voted against it or abstained are essentially the same governments that did that on the emergency resolution, so I don't think the situation has changed that much. The Employers' position remained very clear and you can determine that from the Employer votes on the resolution and their votes in the Selection Committee. The relevant question will be, What are the facts and circumstances in November? If the Burmese do what they need to do, and ought to do, to stop the practice, then I'm sure everyone in the Governing Body will want to recognize that.

BD: In your view, what needs to be done by the Burmese between now and November in order to prevent action under article 33?

Mr. Samet: It's very simple. Stop using forced labor. The burden is now on them to convince the Director-General of the ILO - with facts. The Director-General of the ILO will have to inform the Governing Body as to his view on whether it has stopped. That's the very simple answer. They must convincingly show that the practice has stopped. I don't think they've even come close to meeting that obligation yet.

BD: If the resolution was implemented, how significant an impact do you think the actions would have?

Mr. Samet: Someone argued that perhaps it wouldn't stop forced labor in Burma. That may be true. Ultimately, it's up to the Burmese military to stop forced labor in Burma. They are the ones practicing it, and they can stop it with or without this resolution. Certainly, without the ILO taking a position on this question, without the kind of scrutiny that's been involved, there would be a lot less pressure and a lot less attention to this massive human rights tragedy. The ILO in and of itself is an institution that cannot necessarily compel the Burmese military to stop human rights violations, but what it can do is be very clear about what the circumstances are; be very clear about what its moral obligation is; and be very clear about what its political obligation is; and be very clear what its legal obligation is as an institution. As an institution with a constitution and with rules, it has to take a position consistent with the basic principles of the Organization. Otherwise, it ceases being the organization it claims to be. This is not a case where the ILO can look away from its responsibility. Again, as I have pointed out many times, this is not the view of any one individual or one observer. This situation comes after a long record and after a Commission of Inquiry composed of the most serious and sober individuals, including the former chief justice of India, the former chief justice of Barbados, and a very well-recognized public official from Australia. These are not people given to hyperbole. These are careful finders of fact and conclusion. And their findings are very compelling when you read them. The Organization simply must be as principled as those who it empowered to make this investigation and who reached these conclusions. I don't think the Organization has any choice. We'll have to proceed on the path to which the Conference voted. Consequently, that's why I never doubted the Conference would vote the way it did. BD F What if the Burmese government takes some steps, but not all? What would you expect the response of the Governing Body to be? Mr. Samet: We'll have to see. We'll have to see what "some and not all" actually would be. Ultimately, it's a question, "Have they stopped this practice?" Very simple. That's what they have to do between now and then. The burden is on them to transparently show the world that they have stopped.

BD: Is that the US Government's bottom-line position? The practice of forced labor has to stop?

Mr. Samet : It's not only the US government's view. It's what the Commission of Inquiry recommended; it's the Conference's view. The conclusions of the Commission of Inquiry are very clear. There are two factors. One, they have to change their law, which they haven't done. Number two, they need to immediately stop the practice. The Commission of Inquiry reached that conclusion two years ago. And the Director-General has twice reported to the ILO that, in fact, it hasn't stopped. That was reported as recently as February. And we will have a report on this question again. That is the adopted position of the entire Organization, not of any particular government. And not only of the governments, but also of the Employers' Group and the Workers' Group in the Organization. The Commission of Inquiry's findings were approved by the Organization and by the Governing Body. They were approved in the context of the resolution we voted in at this year's Conference. So again, the "bottom-line" obligation, the "bottom-line" endorsed position of the Organization is - they have to stop this practice. That's very clear.

BD: The report of the ILO technical cooperation mission discussed in detail the need for the Burmese to reform their legislation. This is also one of the recommendations of the Commission of Inquiry. If in fact that was done by the Burmese, do you think that would have a substantial impact on the practice of forced labor?

Mr. Samet: It's not clear to me that law in Burma means anything. So it's not clear to me, whatever their law says, that it would have an affect on their practices. Appearances indicate that there is no rule of law in Burma today. BD F One of the other things that came out in the report of the mission was a suggestion to establish an ILO presence in Burma. Is this something that the US Government would favor? Mr. Samet: I think that depends on the circumstances, on the mandate. We'll have to see.

BD: In your mind, what would be some of the conditions or parameters for doing that?

Mr. Samet: Again, I think the compelling issue before the Organization is seeing to it that this practice of forced labor is stopped. That has to be kept in mind as the bottom line in considerations of eliminating the human rights tragedy being suffered by people who are compelled to undertake forced labor in, oftentimes, the most horrific forms. So as to the issue of an ILO presence, it's only relevant in the context of a program to assure the cessation of this practice. The ILO Conference, the policy-making organ, has already determined that the ILO will not do business as usual with Burma. Burma is precluded from participating in ILO activities and the ILO is precluded from being in Burma to undertake a normal range of activities. So the ILO has already taken a position on this as an institution. The only question is: What ILO activity might be relevant to ensuring compliance of the Commission of Inquiry recommendations? I frankly think [a presence] is relevant only in a context in which the Director-General can assure the Organization that, in fact, the practice has stopped. It doesn't make sense to entertain some kind of ILO participation to help ensure that the circumstances remain.

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