In Their Own Words

VOICES ON THE ILO

Mr. Rolf Thusing
Spokesperson, Employers' Group

BD: Some were not in favor of sending the ILO technical mission to Burma in May, as they felt it was not clear that the Burmese government truly agreed to the ILO's terms for the mission. Do you think it was the right thing to do?

Mr. Thusing: I think it was the right decision to send that technical cooperation mission. Whether both sides had the same understanding might be questioned. But it was right. I think that the ILO did everything that could be regarded as responsible to offer support and to do its best to help to solve the problem.

BD: Why do you think the government agreed to accept the mission at this point in time?

Mr. Thusing: It's of course an area for speculation. Some say they did it because they felt heavy pressure and now they have to give in a little. Other people say that the government also feels unhappy being viewed as some kind of an outcast, and they want to do away with that image. You can speculate, but you can't look into the hearts of people.

BD: What justifies the first-ever use of article 33 in the case of Burma?

Mr. Thusing: We have well-established procedures in the ILO. If a member State has ratified a Convention and the ILO has certified a failure to meet its commitments, there are actions to be taken. In this case there was only one further means, and that was article 33. You are correct, it has never been applied before, but it is in the Constitution. It is a flexible instrument. To apply it was a decision of the Governing Body. We cannot say now, "Okay, let's close the files, that's the end of the story." We have to do our utmost to bring about a change to the situation, to abolish forced labor. It was regarded as a responsible and meaningful action to make that decision on the basis of article 33. It is justified because all other procedures failed and because of the attitude of Myanmar. They didn't give any signs of having the will to cooperate. And if it was not Myanmar, but another country with the same story and the same attitude, it would happen to them.

BD: There was debate on the resolution during the meeting of the Selection Committee. Can you describe what went on?

Mr. Thusing: It is not a secret….In March the Governing Body decided to recommend to the Conference to take actions on the basis of article 33. But, this decision can only be made by the Conference. So the Conference had that point on the agenda; whether some liked it or not, it was put on the agenda by the Governing Body. The Conference gave the work of preparing it to the Selection Committee. Because the Conference is a huge body, all 175 constituents, it's better to deal with it in the Selection Committee where there are 24 government representatives, 12 employers, and 12 workers. During the June 8 meeting of the Selection Committee there was discussion about another proposal launched by some Asian nations to substitute the recommendations of the Governing Body. But in the end, after much discussion, the Selection Committee decided to propose to the Conference the recommendations of the Governing Body, but in a modified way. It was a kind of compromise. I'd say it was a compromise between trust and distrust. What was proposed by these Asian governments - to postpone the whole question of article 33, until next year's conference - was regarded as unacceptable. The distrust was too strong and there was a fear that they would say, "Why don't we do it next year." And then it would be again next year, and then nothing happens.

On the other hand, there were also those who gave more importance to the change in the attitude of the Myanmar Government, which was recorded in the report of the technical cooperation mission. And indeed there was a change. It was the first time they opened the door for discussion, for visitors of the Commission to speak to nearly everyone to whom they wanted to speak, even to the government's opponents. This didn't happen before. That was a change. Then there was the letter from the Minister of Labor. This also was a change. Before the Government of Myanmar said, … "If there was something to do, we have done it. There is nothing left to do." Now, the Minister of Labor has said, "We have taken - and are taking - the necessary steps." It's a little bit of semantics, maybe, but it's the first time that, in writing, the government has recognized that there are things still to be done. The discussion in the Committee was whether it is a significant change or it is irrelevant. The great majority of the Selection Committee, the workers, the employers, agreed that - well we preferred to be disappointed in our trust, rather than be confirmed in our distrust! So we, the employers, worked for that, because if there is a chance, keep it open. Don't destroy the chance. Because everything that needs to be done can only be done by the Government of Myanmar. Of course, part of that resolution is that the ILO has to give the necessary support, but the decision is ultimately with the government. We in the Employers' Group had discussed it internally in depth and it was a modest approach - for some of our colleagues too modest, frankly. We said, "At the moment there are signs of change. Let's keep it open. Let's try to convince the government." You cannot do it by bashing people. That doesn't help.

BD: The Employers' Group, from what I understand, was somewhat receptive to softening the language of the original resolution. Why was that?

Mr. Thusing: First, I think it was important to have the final decision supported by the group as a whole. That strengthens the decision even if the decision gets a majority. But if there is a split in the Employers' Group, then the decision is less effective. So it's important to keep the group together, to work at a compromise. In our Employers' Group, we did the same as what was done by the Committee as a whole in the end. We brought together those with more trust and those who were more skeptical. We were unanimous in the target, that the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission has to be met. That was not a question. But in this there was a broad range of approaches and we worked to bring them together.

BD: So would you say you are satisfied with the compromise resolution that was voted on by the Conference?

Mr. Thusing: I am satisfied that we found that solution. I think it is a wise solution. It does not postpone things year after year after year, but it keeps the door open. Before November, a lot can be done. In November - and that is the core of that compromise - the Conference will decide on the matters to be taken, but we authorized the Governing Body to decide on its implementation with some flexibility….That means the Governing Body, judging the situation in November can say, "Well, everything is done. That's wonderful. It's not necessary to take any of these measures." Or it can say, "There are some steps taken but some things still have to be done. It's not totally finished. It might not be wise, however, to implement all the measures now, so let's implement only this one or this one." So the Governing Body can be flexible.

BD: What do you think will happen between now and November on the part of the Burmese government?

Mr. Thusing: Can you give me an easier question to answer?

BD: Well, what do you hope will happen?

Mr. Thusing: What I hope, yes, that I can say.… I really hope that the Government of Myanmar will take the opportunity and the offer of cooperation to work together with the ILO to do its best to solve the problem. That is my hope. That hope is behind the decision of the resolution.

BD: And your expectations?

Mr. Thusing: I would not exclude that from happening, because it would be a rational decision by the government. On the other hand, you have to wait and see in cases like this where there are a lot of sensitivities. I can't forecast what happens, but I can express my hope. Because there is a chance, a reason for hope.

BD: On the final vote on the compromise resolution, the Asian governments could have decided to abstain, but they chose not to. If they abstained there would not have been a quorum and the resolution would have been killed. Why do you think they decided to vote against the resolution rather than abstain?

Mr. Thusing: You are right. If the 41 who voted against it had abstained instead, no quorum would have been reached. But, it is a very difficult procedural question. Perhaps those voting didn't recognize it. I don't know. Or they thought a "No" vote would be a clear signal, whereas abstention is not a clear signal. I was surprised that when it came to voting on the amendment to the resolution put forward by the Asian nations, which was formerly tailored on six points, those nations agreed to vote on the amendment as a block. I was afraid that they would want a vote on each of the six points of the amendment individually. This would not have helped anything. This may have upset people. But they could have tried to do that. Instead, they said, "No we'll do it en bloc," which was - I don't want to use the word constructive - but it was not destructive.

BD: If in fact there is not much progress between now and November, what do you see happening?

Mr. Thusing: Well, that's a situation I cannot comment on. We have to wait until November and then, on the basis of all the facts available, the Governing Body will have to decide. We will have to see.

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