Strategic
Rivalries On The Bay of Bengal
The Burma/Myanmar Nexus
A
Conference Report
This report is a summary of presentations and discussions at a forum held on February 1st 2001 in Washington, DC. The meeting was sponsored by The Asian Studies Program & The Center for Peace and Security Studies, Georgetown University; The Center for Strategic Studies of the CNA Corporation; The Asia Foundation; and The Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Japan. Among the conference panelists were diplomats including former ambassadors to Burma and current SPDC officials, academics and journalists. The report has been excerpted and edited by Burma Debate.
This conference was an effort to approach the contemporary issues connected with Burma/Myanmar from a perspective that had been ignored in the policy debate on this increasingly important country. Although human rights and internal political issues are critical for the future of that state, analyses of these admittedly vital problems should be supplemented by discourse on other questions that have generally been unarticulated. Thus, this workshop on strategic issues was intended to provide a different lens through which policy makers and analysts could consider a broader range of questions.... Speakers were present from China, Japan, India, Thailand, United Kingdom, Australia, Myanmar and the United States. This report reflects the private views of all those speakers [and] amalgamates views of different participants.
Introduction
The Union of Burma/Myanmar occupies an important geographic and strategic position in Southeast Asia that is often ignored by both academics and policy-makers. Located between India and China, the world's two most populous countries, and situated on the axis of North, South, and Southeast Asia, Myanmar is of strategic interest to states in the region and beyond. With the end of the Cold War and the "rise of China," all Asian regional powers (as well as the United States) have become more attentive to the spread of Chinese influence in Southeast Asia. As Southeast Asia's largest mainland nation, Myanmar has been tenaciously independent, but Myanmar's neighbors, who have in turn changed their policies toward Rangoon in an effort to offset or at least provide an alternative to Chinese influence, have viewed Myanmar's close, recent relationship with China warily. Chinese military assistance, extensive construction of infrastructure, unrecorded investment, [increasing] but undervalued overland trade and large-scale informal migration have all prompted concerns. Myanmar has been both historically suspicious and careful of China, but intensified its relationship after the world ostracized the regime in Rangoon. This has been perceived by some to shift the security and power balance in the region. Indian and ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] relations with Myanmar are focused on engaging the SPDC [State Peace and Development Council]. Although this may disappoint more distant observers of the Burmese regime, such as the United States and the European Union (EU), Myanmar's near neighbors worry not only about the spread of Chinese influence, but also about the myriad problems associated with transnational refugees, drugs, epidemic disease, including HIV/AIDS, illegal migration and crime that spill across Myanmar's porous borders. Because Myanmar cannot be "hermetically sealed" (as it was following the 1962 coup), the surrounding countries have concluded that engagement in the hopes of fostering economic development and eventual regime change is the best means to arrest the instability emanating from Myanmar. Neighboring nations must reconcile the question of the internal sovereignty of that state with the regional problems that have resulted and are often rooted in history.
External Perspectives on Myanmar
Since gaining independence in 1948, Myanmar has been conscious of its geo-strategic importance and has tried to remain a neutral player in the international system, but economic and security imperatives have prompted Myanmar to look for help from regional powers. The insecurity of Myanmar has forced its neighbors to tread carefully and adjust their foreign policies accordingly. The regional community wants Myanmar to remain engaged - bilaterally and within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) - to help remedy the internal problems that affect the politics and population of Myanmar and the quality of life and security of its neighbors.
The Colonial Legacy
When the British granted independence to Burma in 1948, they left behind a country traumatized by colonial rule with a weak government, a fractious society, and strategic vulnerability to both China and India (having maintained a close relationship with China for thousands of years and having been incorporated into British India during colonialism). Burma's weak entrance into the international community as an independent state, coupled with its policy of neutrality, made it a hesitant player in the international system. Above all, Burma was a profoundly insecure state - insecure about its own internal system and about its place in the region and the world.
The colonial legacy produced two tendencies in Burmese society and government: a strong sense of nationalism and a weak understanding of internationalism and its importance for growth. Perceived threats to national unity were forces behind both the 1962 and 1988 military coups, but the international implications of that iron-fisted rule and the disregard for the 1990 election results were far greater than the Burmese government probably predicted. The decision to ignore the 1990 election results was a blow to the regime's credibility: [Members of the] international community either stepped back from involvement or openly condemned the regime. Myanmar must gain a greater understanding of nationalism's effects on internationalism if it expects to survive and grow in the region.
China
Although some claim that China has maintained friendly relations with Myanmar for almost 2000 years, with records available as early as the Tang dynasty [(618-907 AD)], there have been invasions and periods of tension as recently as 1967. Chinese refer to their [relationship with Myanmar] as "brothers born of the same parents." The Burmese were the first to recognize the PRC in 1949, and signed the Sino-Burmese border treaty in 1960 - the first border treaty signed after the Chinese civil war. Since then, China has conducted relations with Burma based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, and has strengthened economic ties. (The Chinese conveniently neglect to mention their support of Burmese communist insurrection.)
China has provided economic assistance to Myanmar, [that includes] investment, dual collaboration capital, factory construction, US$2 billion in military sales, training, and crop-conversion funds. Chinese officials, it was argued, are adamant about the mutual sovereignty of their relationship, insisting that China will not turn Myanmar into a client state, nor will Myanmar become a base for Chinese forces. Military relations have been developing between the two nations, but, it is claimed, have been for the purpose of securing peaceful relations. The Chinese maintain that most military supplies sold to Myanmar have been weapons for defense.
Ignoring the results of the 1990 election isolated Myanmar from many sources of international credit, and China was the one nation willing to give economic, military, and advisory aid to the Burmese. In 1990 and 1994, China and Myanmar signed arms sales agreements and China has been willing to help with infrastructure renovations and border maintenance. It is this close relationship with China that has India and other members of the international community worried about Myanmar's future and China's intentions. Myanmar, however, is said to be resolute in its dedication to neutrality, and some academics believe it will begin to back away from dependence on China.
Chinese investment in Myanmar is grossly underestimated because it does not go through the National Investment Board. Chinese trade seems greatly undervalued and Chinese immigration into Myanmar has been extensive (estimates range from one to two million Chinese now in the country, compared to several hundred thousand before 1988). One-quarter of Mandalay is said to be Yunnanese Chinese, as is one-half of Lashio.
In spite of extensive Chinese influence, it is doubtful that Myanmar will become a Chinese satellite in the event of a regional strategic crisis. The nationalism that is so apparent in Myanmar, the strong military drive to guarantee Burmese territorial integrity, and its past ability to deal with foreign powers as a neutral during the Cold War indicate that Myanmar may have the "whip hand" in this relationship.
India
Once the British left Burma, India did not maintain significant trade, military or social ties with Burma, but relations between the two nations were friendly. (There had been a substantial Indian minority in Burma that controlled much of the economy in the colonial period, and many remained until expelled by the military around 1963. Rule from India and Indian economic dominance created prejudices among the Burmans that still linger.) However, 1988 witnessed a shift in the relationship because of the military crackdown, the increase in Sino-Burmese ties, and the cooling off of Indo-Burmese relations. India felt that it was caught in a pincer movement orchestrated by China, with Pakistan and Myanmar as potential supports of Chinese policy. While India, as the largest democracy in Asia, wanted to condemn the acts of the SLORC/SPDC and distance itself from positive relations with Myanmar, several factors precluded isolationism:
Faced with these security considerations and the growing power of the Burmese military regime, India has elected to increase contact with Myanmar and continues to pursue an engagement strategy. From New Delhi's viewpoint, this policy shift appears to be successful; illegal logging has declined, terrorist groups are less active, border management is better and the military regime has improved its contacts with the democratic Indian government through more frequent and mutual high-level visits. For the future, India hopes to increase multilateral ties with Myanmar by integrating it into regional economic groups, such as the Bay of Bengal Community (BIMSTEC-Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Economic Community), and the Ganges-Mekong Forum.
India is conscious of Myanmar's strategic importance, and worries that China's actions in the country are indicative of larger regional initiatives. India seeks to moderate the Chinese influence by exposing Myanmar to regional and international groups and [by] dealing with high-level officials in the Burmese government, thus engaging Myanmar in dialogue. India's BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party]-led government, moreover, takes the view that an across-the-board policy of engagement with Asia - including important new initiatives in Southeast Asia (notably Indonesia and Vietnam) and with Japan - will augment India's voice in regional developments. Rhetorically, Prime Minister [Shri Atal] Vajpayee and his Foreign Minister, Jaswant Singh, omit any mention of China as the perceived object of these moves, a strategy enhanced by India's membership (along with China) in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia's only formal multilateral security forum.
Of all the Southeast Asian states, Myanmar occupies the most sensitive position between India and China, giving rise to routine descriptions of a 'Sino-India rivalry' over the country. In this, as in other issues relating to perceived competition between Asia's two largest powers, the Indians tend more often to see deeper designs in Chinese links with the Myanmar authorities than do the Chinese in India's attempts, since 1993, to cultivate a 'working relationship' with the SLORC/SPDC. Much of China's relationship with Myanmar has an orientation toward Southeast Asia, and reflects a natural - some say inevitable - opening of Yunnan Province to the Burman lowland via improved road and communications links. China's interest as a riparian Mekong River state fall into this category as well. Nor does India alone have misgivings about China's apparent ability to monitor traffic heading into the Straits of Malacca through joint activities with the [Tatmadaw]. The Indonesians privately convey concern to the Myanmar military about Chinese influence. Beijing, in turn, takes a more [relaxed] view of India's influence in Myanmar, confident that earlier enmities and friction will preserve at least minimal equidistance between Myanmar and the two Asian powers. But this does not reduce jockeying between Beijing and Delhi over access to senior officers in the SPDC.
Thailand
Thailand is the one neighbor most influenced by Myanmar's internal problems. Fortunately, the Thai government has realized that"Thailand and Burma share a common destiny; a prosperous and secure Burma is vital for Thailand's security and well-being." This mindset, first voiced in 1980, is still the strategic context in Thai-Burmese relations today. Thailand remains actively involved in Myanmar. While the 1988 coup made communication difficult and relations strained, Thailand has never backed away from engagement policies.
Thailand is the nation most afflicted by Myanmar's social problems: refugees (about 120,000 Karen and Mon in official figures), disease, drugs and terrorism. For the past twelve years, between 700,000 and one million illegal workers have fled from Myanmar to Thailand, adding tremendous pressure to local Thai governments, economies, and social programs. There has been a massive influx of narcotics, including heroin and methamphetamines, creating serious national and international problems. The 2,401 km long border shared by Thailand and Myanmar is an area of instability, with border skirmishes and terrorism taking place on a regular basis. Myanmar's disease problem has seeped into Thailand. These diseases include a reoccurrence of polio and a new HIV/AIDS strain, in a country where the leading cause of death was already AIDS. All this has colored relations between the two countries and has even affected Thai politics.
In 1991, Thailand launched its policy of "constructive engagement." It has been a disappointment to Bangkok; despite Thailand's increased contact with the Burmese government, the bilateral problems remain unsolved. The greatest success of the engagement policy was the 1997 entrance of Myanmar into ASEAN. [The association's] policy of non-interference in internal affairs, however, did not improve Thai leverage in solving the social problems plaguing both nations. Thailand has twice modified its Myanmar policy, first to "flexible engagement," and now to "enhanced interaction." The words have changed, but not the thrust. The enhanced interaction has purportedly been successful in that dialogue has increased: members of the SPDC must attend ASEAN meetings where they are exposed to other government officials and the international press.
Until several years ago, Thai bilateral policy toward Myanmar was the province of the Thai military, not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This changed under the last government and seems to have disconcerted the Burmese military, which was unsure of how to deal with this change. Under the new Thai government, it is unclear where the locus of authority will lie in this important bilateral relationship.
Unfortunately, the Burmese problem is "felt physically" in Thailand, and its borders are so porous that insurgents need only walk across the border to commit acts of international terrorism. Thailand remains hopeful that with greater integration and "enhanced interaction", the Myanmar problems will be solved and tensions between the two nations reduced. Until that time, Thailand must use its own resources and rely on its own allies to fix the internal problems that originated across the border.
Japan
Japan's policy toward Myanmar consists of four approaches: dialogue, constructive engagement, joint U.S.-Japan policy, and promoting incremental change. Japan, like the United States, supports the concept of democratic government, but seeks to interact with, rather than isolate, the current military regime. Like Thailand, Japan believes that increased interaction with regional bodies and democratic countries will incrementally change Burmese government policies on issues of concern (forced labor, human rights, disease and drugs), and believes that dialogue is crucial to maintaining a balance of power on mainland Southeast Asia.
Although Japan recognizes the potential for Chinese-Indian strategic rivalry over Myanmar, it also appreciates the power of ASEAN as a mitigating force. As an ally of the United States and a close friend and investor in several Southeast Asian countries, Japan is in a policy bind, caught between strict U.S. policies toward Myanmar and the engagement policies of ASEAN. Japan attempts to straddle both policy approaches, generally supporting the goals of the U.S. and the West, and the efforts of the ASEAN nations. Japan worries about a Myanmar closely linked to China that would materially strengthen Chinese strategic capacities close to the sea lanes between the Persian Gulf and Northeast Asia.
The United States
The United States pursues the most stringent policies toward Myanmar and was the first country to impose economic sanctions on Myanmar in 1997. Myanmar's human rights abuses, drug production and ignoring of the election results in 1990 have prompted even stronger legislation in the hopes that the military regime will weaken and begin a dialogue with the opposition that could move [the country] toward democracy. The U.S. has enacted policies restricting bilateral assistance, private investment, and contact between the two nations through denying American visas to high-level regime personnel, although it has indirectly provided anti-drug and humanitarian aid through the UN and international [non-governmental organizations (NGOs)].
U.S. foreign policy toward Myanmar has been likened to a train on a set of tracks, unable to diverge unless a crisis interrupts the policy direction. Currently, the U.S. doctrine is to support democratic and oppose authoritarian regimes - to advocate a quick, unequivocal democratic shift. [Polarized views on whether] such a shift is feasible, or whether a more incremental approach to pluralism in [Myanmar's] society is a rational alternative policy, make debate on this issue difficult. Some charge that U.S. policy toward Myanmar has been focused on a single individual, and question the wisdom of such an approach as a generic issue in foreign policy. This ad hominem element of U.S. policy has been based on the close relationship between the former Secretary of State [Madeleine Albright] and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Whether this will continue under the new U.S. administration is uncertain. If, however, the humanitarian crisis escalates, if regional equanimity dissipates, or if the military regime collapses, the U.S. will obviously have to re-examine its Myanmar policy and re-evaluate the strategic importance of the country. The issue is whether such a policy re-evaluation should take place in the absence of fundamental power shifts [within Myanmar's] society or if there are cosmetic changes that do not affect the military's essential control. With the present increased political dialogue, one participant noted that "the trends are all very much hopeful for the first time in over a decade," and if the situation arises, the U.S. will be ready to lend support. Until then, the U.S. policy of non-involvement will continue, leaving Southeast Asia to engage Myanmar without the U.S. and the EU.
ASEAN
The central debate surrounding ASEAN's Myanmar policy is whether or not the regional body will mitigate China's influence on Myanmar. ASEAN has been an important venue for Myanmar's relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors because it provides a structure for dealing with the transnational issues that strain relations among them. Additionally, the members of ASEAN believe some good will come of exposing Myanmar to non-authoritarian regimes.
Myanmar was first exposed to ASEAN after the military regime took power, attending several meetings and settling some disputes with Thailand within the organization. Thailand invited Myanmar to join the organization, and once satisfied with the sanctity of ASEAN's non-intervention policy, Myanmar became a member in 1997. Before Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997, ASEAN states had quiet discussions at all levels with Myanmar officials, but they were not very successful; the problems seemed intractable even without the issue of the NLD. Opponents to Myanmar's ascension into the group cite the increased access China has to the organization, and the too-broad membership of ASEAN that could preclude cooperation. Yet ASEAN has made it clear to the Myanmar authorities that discussion of transnational issues is part of the terms of the relationship. Myanmar's problems are discussed frankly in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). This informal meeting of heads of state led to the positive outcome of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed's January 2001 visit to Myanmar. According to a participant at the ARF, none of this would have been possible without Myanmar joining ASEAN.
Myanmar's Response
Myanmar's long history as a tributary, a colony, and a country riddled with insurgencies has led [its] officials to place great emphasis on their foreign policy of neutrality, independence, and interaction. While Myanmar acknowledges its important location between China and India and on the border between North and Southeast Asia, it "hopes to be used as a bridge of all these blocs" and as a "role model" of a state [positioned] between major neighbors, according to one participant. Additionally, it maintains that the international perception of the Chinese-Myanmar partnership is vastly overestimated, and seeks to distance itself from perceptions of dependency.
The military regime asserts that the sanctions, loss of funding and decline in diplomatic relations after the 1988 coup was a drastic miscalculation by the international community about the internal situation in Myanmar. The government maintains that the military regime took power because the Burmese people were suffering under the Socialist regime, and that the amount of individual and political freedom afforded to the Burmese after the coup was greater than pre-1988. The election results were ignored by the SLORC because the NLD allegedly tried to take power without drafting a Constitution - and the SLORC felt that security and freedom would be greater under a military government than under the newly elected one. Before 1988, Burma had good relations with all countries and the multilateral banks, but after 1988, all support stopped. Before 1988, there was only one legal party, but after 1988 the SLORC allowed diverse parties to be formed. (The West has put personality over policies and ideology since 1988, and now relations are at their lowest ebb.)
Myanmar's government believes that a large military is crucial to the preservation of Burmese sovereignty and internal security, and resents the stringent foreign policies pursued by the United States, the European Union and others. As one participant commented, "if you are going to interfere in this discussion, you must treat Myanmar like a leader and not a sister... lecturing is unnecessary." For now, according to a participant, a large military seems to be the best way of preserving the national unity of Myanmar, and the military has been successful in orchestrating both cease-fires and counter-insurgencies.
The Myanmar government acknowledges the social problems that plague the country and seep into neighboring populations. It actively seeks assistance from international organizations and [NGOs] and is willing to cooperate with recommendations involving drugs, disease and poverty. Myanmar does not deny the problems, but lacks the funds - and, some would say - the skills to appropriately and comprehensively combat them.
Over the past ten years, Myanmar has begun to participate internationally, increasing both bilateral and multilateral relations in the region. These relations will continue as long as Myanmar's sovereignty, territorial integrity and internal policy-making freedom remain unthreatened. If outside powers do not intervene, dialogue will probably continue between the SPDC and the NLD. Myanmar realizes the steps it must take to develop, but it must take these steps alone and of its own accord, or the process will deteriorate.
Conclusion
Myanmar has the potential to be the focus of regional and international tensions, but is the strategic rivalry over Myanmar real or perceived?
Real or perceived, there is no doubt that the importance of Myanmar will increase over time, and this factor must also be taken into account when formulating a Myanmar policy. Although the need for realpolitik policy-making has declined since the Cold War, balance-of-power politics have not disappeared. Myanmar must be examined in its new geo-strategic context, as well as in terms of human rights and democratic principles. There may not be a need for policy change, but there should at least be dialogue - that is what the international community is asking of Myanmar, and it is the least Myanmar should expect in return.
The complete report can be found on the web at www.georgetown.edu/sfs/program/asia.